Collective Individualism: Deconstructing the Legal City by Poindexter, Georgette C.
COLLECTIVE INDIVIDUALISM:
DECONSTRUCTING THE LEGAL CITY
GEORGETTE C. POINDEXTERt
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 608
I. REVEALED PREFERENCE FOR THE SUBURBS
TRANSFORMED INTO STYLISTIC FACT ............................................ 612
A. Economic Motivation for Suburban Shift ............................... 613
B. Political/Legal Motivation for Suburban Shift ....................... 616
C. Social Motivation for Suburban Shift ................................... 618
D. Suburban Shift as Self-Definition in the Creation
of the Collective Individual ................................................. 621
II. THE MOLDING OF POLITICAL POWER AROUND
THE COLLECTIVE INDIVIDUAL ....................................................... 624
A. Housing vs. Schools-Gautreaux,
Milliken and Their Progeny ............................................... 628
B. Annexation and Other Manipulations of
Municipal Boundaries ....................................................... 631
C. Local Governments and Voting Rights .................................. 634
III. THE COLLECTIVE INDIVIDUAL AND MORAL HYPERNORMS ............ 635
A. The Legal Ability to Exclude ................................................ 636
B. Limitations on the Ability to Exclude .................................... 639
1. Necessity of State Action ................................................ 639
2. Abandoning the State Action Requirement .................. 641
3. Limits on State Intervention .......................................... 646
IV. THE STRUGGLE TO RESTRUCTURE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ............... 648
A. The Neighborhood as a Political Entity .................................. 649
t Citibank Term Assistant Professor of Real Estate and Legal Studies, Wharton
School, University of Pennsylvania; Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylva-
nia Law School. Thanks to the Annenberg Dubois Policy Fellowship and to the Whar-
ton Real Estate Center for financial support of this research. The author thanks Re-
gina Austin, Richard Briffault, Tom Dunfee, Susan Friewald, Peter Linneman, Ken
Shropshire and Bill Tyson for their very helpful comments on an earlier draft. Thanks
also to the participants in the Legal Studies/Real Estate Brown Bag discussions.
Thanks to Jerry Frug and Alan Strudler for helpful discussions on this project. Of
course, any errors remaining are solely mine.
(607)
608 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW
B. Constructing the Political Neighborhood ............................. 653
V. POLITICAL REALIYAND SOCIALJUSTICE ......................................... 656
A. Paradox of a Collective Choice Democracy .............................. 657
1. The Individual Within the Political Neighborhood ..... 658
2. The Individual Within the Region ................................. 660
B. Dissatisfaction with the Status Quo ........................................ 662
VI. CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 663
The true meaning of the word "City" has been almost entirely lost by
the moderns, most of whom think that a Town and a City are identical,
and that to be a Burgess is the same thing as to be a Citizen. They do
not know that houses may make a town, but that only citizens can make
a City. -Rousseau'
INTRODUCTION
The dialogue begun by Professor Gerald Frug2 and taken up in
many subsequent articles, invites us to construct the Legal City. In
IJean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, in SOCIAL CONTRACr: ESSAYS BY
LOCKE, HUME, AND ROUSSEAU 169, 181 n.5 (Oxford Univ. Press 1962) (1762).
2 See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1059 (1980)
(exqlaining the law's contribution to "the current powerlessness of American cities").
See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local Government
Law, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 4 (1990) [hereinafter Our Localism: Part 1] (providing a
critical reading of the "law of state-local relations"); Richard Briffault, Our Localism:
Part II-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346 (1990) [hereinafter Our Lo-
calism: Part I1] (describing interlocal differences and setting forth a normative ac-
count of local power); Richard Briffault, Voting Rights, Home Rule and Metropolitan Gov-
ernance: The Secession of Staten Island as a Case Study in the Dilemmas of Local Self-
Determination, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 775, 779 (1992) [hereinafter Voting Rights] (arguing
that the fragmentation of cities such as New York creates "serious... economic, politi-
cal, and social concerns"); Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote
and Local Governments, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 339, 343 (1993) [hereinafter Who Rules at
Home ("The encounter between one person/one vote and American local govern-
ment... tells us something about both the uncertain conceptual underpinnings of
our dominant conception of representation and the multiple roles local governments
play in American life."); Richard T. Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in
LegalAnalysis, 107 NARV. L. REV. 1841, 1845 (1994) ("[R]acially identified space results
from public policy and legal sanctions-in short, from state action-rather than being
the unfortunate but irremediable consequence of purely private or individual
choices."); Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 253, 254 (1993)
(rejecting the "traditional understanding of decentralized power in America");Joan C.
Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local Government: The Politics of City
Status in American Law, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 83, 86-87 (1986) (discussing "the current im-
pact of the constitutional vulnerability of cities" and Frug's use of "the issue of city
status as a proxy for his fears and aspirations about governmental power").
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these works the city as a legal entity is viewed either vis-a.-vis its inhabi-
tants or in relation to higher forms of government. The emphasis has
been on the law's role in justifying, defending and criticizing existing
local government.
I propose that we deconstruct the Legal City and view the existence
of the city, in fact all of local government, as a manifestation of revealed
choice based on the collective individualism of its citizens. I define collec-
tive individualism as spatially delineated individual expressions of self
that are aggregated into community definition. Instead of beginning
with a legal structure-local government-to explain economic results
(such as income disparities between cities and suburbs), we need to be-
gin with economic realities (such as people searching for their ideal lo-
cal community), and craft legal structures to support these realities. We
need to validate consumers' individualism and revealed choice by dis-
solving legal impediments to the full and free expression of their
choice.
Economic, legal and social agendas compel the deconstruction of
the Legal City. On the legal front, municipal government is, and his-
torically has been, of uncertain status.4 Its status is indeterminate due,
in no small part, to competing and diametrically opposed views of the
source of local legal power. Is the city autonomous or a mere arm of
the state? Until we peel back the layers of doctrine imposed by these
conflicting ideas of municipal government to expose the true nature of
local government power-which, I submit, is premised on the power of
the collective individual-the legal status of the city will continue to
flounder.
Deconstruction of the Legal City is further necessitated by harsh
economic reality. Problems of poverty, crime and social welfare of ur-
ban centers continue to occupy the domestic agenda of the United
States. However, as the population (most notably the middle-income
population) shifts away from the city to the suburbs, the economic abil-
ity to rectify city-centered problems often lies in the hands of those
people least likely to live in the city.' Increasingly, regional economic
power has moved to the suburbs while regional social problems have
remained in the city. The result is a seemingly never-ending search for
4 See infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
In 1987 the per capita income of city residents was 59% of their suburban neigh-
bors. Some cities fared even worse. For example in Philadelphia in 1990, the city per
capita income was 48% of the suburban per capita income. See Georgette C. Poindex-
ter, Towards a Legal Framevork for Regional Redistribution of Poverty-Related Expenses, 47
WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMI'. L. 3, 10 (1995).
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legal methods that permit city leaders to tap suburban wallets to solve
inner city problems.
Finally, we must confront the problem of determining the social
morality of a political community, such as a city. In a nation founded
and premised upon an exaltation of heterogeneity, is there room for
validation of homogeneity? Deconstruction of the Legal City based on
collective individualism may push counter to the almost sacrosanct so-
cial goals of racial and ethnic integration and inclusionary zoning. Al-
though a frank discussion of the legitimacy of these goals may be politi-
cally difficult, blind acceptance of these goals without debate produces
a political structure with the weakest of normative underpinnings. The
moral goals of the creation of a political community should not be as-
sumed.
The starting point for deconstruction is a critical examination of
demographic facts. The massive middle class shift to the suburbs and
away from the city is a most certain reality. Calls for regional govern-
ance, once in vogue,8 have reappeared.9  However, whether due to
myopia or to calculated disregard for the reality of America's shift to
the suburbs, advocates of regionalism fail to see the obvious: America's
middle class has left the city for the suburbs. This exodus exhibits a re-
vealed preference for life outside the city. Suburbanites view calls for
regional government as thinly veiled ruses for sucking them (and their
wallets) back into the system from which they fled. Regional govern-
ment does not question whether the present system of local govern-
ment meets the needs of modern political society. In fact, it does just
the opposite. Although regional government may respond to problems
of transportation and revenue sharing, it does not respond to the criti-
6 See, e.g., Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1994).
7 See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336
A.2d 713, 724 (N.J. 1975) (Mount Laurel 1) ("Every... municipality must, by its land
use regulations, presumptively make realistically possible an appropriate variety and
choice of housing."); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Lau-
rel, 456 A.2d. 390, 410 (NJ. 1983) (Mount Laurel I1) (clarifying and strengthening the
original decision in Mount Laurel 1); Hills Dev. Co. v. Township of Bernards, 510 A.2d
621, 654 (1986) (Mount Laurel I1) (reinforcing the commitment to "the provision of a
realistic opportunity for the construction of needed lower income housing").
8 See, e.g., Robert C. Wood, A Division of Powers in Metropolitan Areas, in AREA AND
POwER: A THEORY OF LOCAL GOvERNMENT 53, 55 (Arthur Maass ed., 1959) ("Finally,
and happily, perhaps, there appears to be a readiness to experiment with new struc-
tures of government....").
9 See, e.g., DAVID RUSK, CmEs WITHOUT SUBURBS 85 (1993) ("The 'city' must be
redefined to reunify city and suburb. Ideally, such reunification is achieved through
metropolitan government.").
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cal need for an economic, political or social basis for creation of a po-
litical community.
Instead of fighting the strong current of revealed consumer prefer-
ence, we should use that preference as the basis for empowering local
government. That which strengthens revealed choice will be imple-
mented. That which impedes the quest for individualism will be dis-
carded. Instead of attempting to convince those who have left the city
(both businesses and residents) that it is in their best interest to care
about the city that they left behind, the law should validate their loca-
tional decisions by strengthening the independence of individual
communities. A region's citizens cannot be melted into one big re-
gional pot without ignoring the differing mixes of taxes, services and
social desires of individuals within the region.
This argument, however, is not a wholesale adoption of Charles
Tiebout's theory of public choice. '° The fragmentation of local gov-
ernment produces significant externalities that cannot be assumed
away. Just as calls for regionalism are myopic, sole reliance on individ-
ual choice ignores the accompanying externalities. Acknowledging the
middle-class move to the suburbs as a revealed preference does not
help solve the problem of poverty left behind in the cities. For that we
must fashion a mechanism that internalizes the externalities.
I propose that the Legal City be dismantled in two stages. First,
remove the barriers to expression of individual choice to allow all resi-
dents the opportunity to create the community that they desire.
Neighborhoods would be free to secede from their existing jurisdiction
without externally imposed limitations so as to form the community
that they seek. It is here that we must confront the social and moral
limitations on community selection. To what extent should a commu-
nity be allowed to "define" itself? Is economic segregation permissible
but racial and ethnic discrimination impermissible? The answer lies in
the discovery of community hypernorms that will serve as the moral
compass for community formation. Hypernorms are those normative
values so fundamental to human existence that they have universal ap-
plication.
There will, however, be people who have neither the political savvy
nor the economic independence to declare their freedom from City
Hall. By default, and by choice, some neighborhoods will remain
10 See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64J. POL. ECON. 416,
424 (1956) ("If consumer-voters are fully mobile, the appropriate local governments,
whose revenue-expenditure patterns are set, are adopted by the consumer-voters.").
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within the geographic and political boundaries of what was once the
"city." To address the externalities associated with such legal dissection,
the second part of the deconstruction sets up an intermediate tier of
local government to engage solely in wealth redistribution. Such a re-
distribution would be region-wide-not the more commonly feared
suburb-to-city flow of money.
Part I of this Article introduces the concept of American consum-
ers' revealed preference for the suburbs. It explores the stylized fact
that Americans, in general, prefer the suburbs to the city. This Part ex-
plores the reasons why suburbs are growing in population while the
central cities are shrinking. Part II discusses the ways in which the pres-
ent system of local government law affects this revealed preference of
community choice by building walls between the city and its suburbs
while simultaneously rejecting local attempts at economic and political
isolation. In Part III, the moral and normative bases of community are
analyzed to shape a working model of community values. Part IV syn-
thesizes the preceding discussion by exploring ways to restructure
American local government in an attempt to combine a validation of
collective individualism with a legitimate normative base, while creating
a wealth redistribution plan that would benefit the entire region. Part
V concludes the discussion by fitting the new model within the confines
of political reality and social justice.
I. REVEALED PREFERENCE TRANSFORMED INTO STYLIZED FACT
Do what you may, there is no true power among men except in the free
union of their will.
-Alexis de Tocqueville
The shift of America's population away from the city and to the
suburbs is a stylized fact. 2 Although it is beyond the scope of this dis-
1ALEXIS DE TOCQUEvILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 69 (Richard D. Heffner ed.,
1956).
12 Stylized facts are empirical regularities that describe the most obvious features
of a dynamic system. See generally MICHAEL REITER, THE DYNAMICS OF BUSINESS CYCLES:
STYLIZED FACTS, ECONOMIC THEORY, ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY AND APPLICATIONS
9-12 (1995). A stylized fact requires an analytical model to explain its existence. For
example, assume that women earn 60% of the wages earned by men. The existence of
this fact requires a theoretical explanation, such as discrimination, lower productive
ability or genetic differences. In a discussion using stylized facts, the validity of the
statistic is accepted as fact. See Charles W. Calomiris, The Motivations for Loan Commit-
ments Backing Commercial Paper, 13 J. BANKING & FIN. 271, 271 (1989) (discussing a
model that explains "the 'stylized fact' that firms with a high percentage of backing for
[Vol. 145:607
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cussion to prove this fact statistically, some numbers are in order to
convince the nonbeliever. In 1940, over one-half of Americans lived in
rural areas; more than twice as many lived in the central cities of met-
ropolitan areas as lived in the suburbs. 3 By 1970, the suburbs had
surged ahead and, for the first time, had a greater population than ei-
ther the cities or rural areas. 4 The suburban steam engine continues to
roll. We have entered the "suburban century" in politics,'5 when almost
half of the American population now lives in the suburbs.
Relative loss of population to the suburbs is not solely a problem of
the nation's largest cities. Overall population density in America's 522
central cities has declined from 5,873 persons per square mile in 1950
to 2,937 persons per square mile in 1990.r In 1950, there were thirty-
eight cities with population density greater than 10,000 or more per-
sons per square mile. By 1990, there were only fifteen cities that were
that dense.'
7
If the nonbeliever is still not convinced of the stylized fact of Amer-
ica's move to the suburbs, a quick check of regional dominance should
persuade her. In the 1950s, fifty-seven percent of people residing in
major metropolitan areas lived in the central city and forty-three per-
cent lived in the suburbs. 8 By 1990, however, the city's share of the
metropolitan population plummeted to thirty-seven percent and the
suburban share increased to sixty-three percent.19
Although the shift away from the city to the suburbs can easily be
seen statistically, understanding the economic, political, legal and social
ramifications requires a more in-depth analysis. Statistics describe how
the population shifts; what is missing is the why.
A. Economic Motivation
An economic explanation for the shift to the suburbs follows from
their commercial paper tend to have high commercial paper ratings."); Brian H.
McGavin, The Political Business Cycle: A Reexamination of Some Empirical Evidence, 26 QJ.
Bus. & ECON. 36, 36 (1987) ("The political business cycle usually is accepted as a styl-
ized fact of democratic industrial countries.").
:3 SeeJerry Adler, Bye Bye Suburban Dream, NEWSWEEK, May 15, 1995, at 41.
'4 See id.
15 William Schneider, The Suburban Century Begins, THE ATLANTIC, July 1992, at 33.
6 See RUSK, supra note 9, at 8.
17 See id.
is See Peter Mieszkowski & Edwin S. Mills, The Causes of Metropolitan Suburbanization,
J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 1993, at 135.
19 See id.
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the work of Charles Tiebout 20 Simply stated, the Tiebout hypothesis
contends that a consumer searches within the region for the municipal-
ity that best satisfies her optimal mix of services and taxes.2' Just as a
consumer chooses between supermarkets based on service and price, so
does she choose among municipalities. Spatial mobility-the ability to
move one's residence-provides the local public-goods corollary to the
private-market trip.22 "There is no way in which the consumer can avoid
revealing his preferences in a spatial economy.
"
,
3
Although perhaps valid in other situations, criticisms of the Tiebout
model (such as informational barriers, assumption of cost-neutral
choice and absence of racial/ethnic barriers) 24 are inapplicable in the
present context. Application of the Tiebout hypothesis here only re-
quires comparison between the city and its suburbs-not among sub-
urbs themselves. Individual suburbs are fungible in a city-versus-
suburbs decision tree. Reduction of the decision tree to two branches,
however, should not obliterate the impact of local government frag-
mentation on revealed choice. Although our consumer is choosing be-
tween the city and suburbs, her choice is enhanced by the existence of
20 See Tiebout, supra note 10, at 418; see also CHARLES L. LEVEN &JONATHAN MARK,
A REVEALED PREFERENCE MODEL FOR ANALYZING INTERNEIGHBORHOOD MOBILITY 1
(Institute for Urban & Reg'l Studies, Wash. U., Working Paper HMS 6, 1975)
(suggesting several "hypotheses why people move between neighborhoods"); Bruce W.
Hamilton, Property Taxes and the Tiebout Hypothesis: Some Empirical Evidence, in FISCAL
ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS 13, 14 (Edwin S. Mills & Wallace E. Oates eds.,
1975) (criticizing Tiebout for his failure to "endow his mechanism with a system of
prices for the local public services"); Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, TheJudi-
cial Pursuit of Local Fiscal Equity, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1662, 1669 (1979) ("A family decid-
ing where to locate within a metropolitan area will search for a community that pro-
vides that bundle of municipal services and housing which most closely approximates
its preferred package.").2)1
SeeTiebout, supra note 10, at 418; see also Steven L. Percy et al., Revisiting Tiebout:
Moving Rationales and Interjurisdictional Relocation, 25 PUBLIUS, Fall 1995, at 1, 10
(analyzing interjurisdictional moves in Milwaukee in 1992 and concluding that "tax
and service factors are used more often in selecting a new residence").
22 See Tiebout, supra note 10, at 422.
23 Id.
24 See Harold A. McDougall, Regional Contribution Agreements: Compensation for Exclu-
sionay Zoning, 60 TEMP. L.Q. 665, 667-68 (1987) ("[T]he value of Tiebout's thesis ap-
pears of limited value in the context of exclusionary zoning."); Wallace E. Oates, On
Local Finance and the Tiebout Model 71 AM. ECON. REV. 93, 93 (AEA Papers & Proceed-
ings 1981) (suggesting that the Tiebout model "involves a set of assumptions so pat-
ently unrealistic as to verge on the outrageous"); Stewart E. Sterk, Competition Among
Municipalities as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions, 45 VAND. L. REV. 831, 834 (1992)
(explaining "why market forces are inadequate to eliminate the potential for munici-
pal abuse of the exaction process").
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several varied local governments from which she may pick.25
Empirical data, in fact, bear out the Tiebout hypothesis. Consum-
ers do choose between the city and the suburbs based upon a bundle of
taxes and services. Middle-class migration between the city and the
suburbs is significantly related to two salient differences between city
26and suburbs: (1) taxes and (2) spending for education. In effect, a
consumer's move to the suburbs is a revealed preference for that com-
munity's bundle of goods and services. To place this theory in context,
the movement to the suburbs shows that consumers are not buying
what the city has to offer. Being rational economic customers, they are
buying the product that best serves their needs; that product just hap-
pens to be located in the suburbs. Suburban governments compete for
citizens who contribute more in taxes than they consume in services to
maintain this competitive advantage.
Revealed preference is premised upon consumers' rational choice
between alternatives, a choice that is based on welfare maximization.
Paul Samuelson's "Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference" states that "if
an individual selects batch one over batch two, he does not at the same
time select two over one."2 7 In other words, selection of one location is
a rejection of all other locations. In choosing a location, the consumer
28reveals her preference for that location. This choice, though, is made
Fragmentation allows municipalities to include, or exclude, residents in accor-
dance with the wishes of the municipality through zoning ordinances, also known as
exclusionary zoning. See Stephen D. Galowitz, Interstate Metro-Regional Responses to Ex-
clusionary Zoning, 27 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.J. 49, 61 (1992) (suggesting that a desire
to increase housing prices is an incentive to exclude). This concept, however, goes
deeper than zoning ordinances. Beyond the law there is evidence that inter-
jurisdictional differences in tax rates and public sector benefits are capitalized into
residential property values. See Bruce W. Hamilton, Capitalization of Intrajurisdictional
Differences in Local Tax Prices, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 743, 743 (1976) (developing a model
in which "the excess of local public sector benefits over tax liability (or fiscal surplus)
causes shifts in the demand curves for various classes of residential property").
26 See Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
473, 524 (1991) ("Many studies have shown that middle-class migration between the
city and the suburbs is significantly affected by the disparity between city and suburban
spending for education."); Percy, supra note 21, at 13, 14 (noting that taxes and the
quality of public schools are significant predictors of cross-community relocations).
27 Paul A. Samuelson, A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer's Behaviour, ECONOMICA,
February 1938, at 61, 65 (with errata, August 1938).
28 A theoretical difficulty with Samuelson's theory is that it supposes only two al-
ternatives. Kenneth Arrow relaxed the Samuelson framework in two ways: he allowed
for the possibilities 1) that there were more than budget sets involved in the choice
and 2) that consumers could have more than one "best" alternative when faced with a
set. KENNETHJ. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 46 (1951). Arrow set
forth the "Impossibility Theorem," which questions the ability to make collective deci-
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as a result of consumers' attempts to maximize wealth. 2 It is funda-
mental that, if given a choice, a consumer "selects the alternative which
yields the greatest welfare."
30
The economic explanation presents the consumer with a choice be-
tween living in the city and living in the suburbs. Leaving aside the
myriad of choices among suburbs, the consumer will compare the eco-
nomic advantages and disadvantages of the suburbs with those of the
city in an attempt to maximize her wealth. Because cities are generally
burdened with higher taxes, older infrastructure and weaker services
(especially public education), the rational (and economically inde-
pendent) consumer will choose the suburbs.3'
B. Political/Legal Motivation
The political impetus for the move to the suburbs may be the desire
to have a meaningful voice in participatory democracy. A citizen must
count herself as a consensual member of the community if democracy,
based on majority rule, is truly to exist. As Rousseau stated:
The undertakings which bind us to the Commonwealth are obligatory
only because they are mutual .... For how can the general will be al-
ways right, and how can all constantly will the happiness of each, if every
single individual does not include himself in that word each, so that in
voting for the general interest he may feel that he is voting for his own?3
2
To borrow Hannah Arendt's idea of freedom, local government re-
sponds to a citizen's need "to participate actively in the basic societal
sions because social choice is an aggregation of individual preferences. Id. Just as
Condorcet proved, collective decisionmaking is impossible when more than two alter-
natives are presented. For a description of the Condorcet paradox, see Maxwell L.
Stearns, Standing Back From the Forest: Justiciability and Social Choice, 83 CAL. L. REV.
1309, 1329 (1995) (describing the decisionmaking process of law review editors in the
selection of one article for publication when faced with three possible choices). Be-
cause we are dealing only with a choice between the city and the suburb, Arrow's the-
ory is inapplicable.
This means that a consumer will choose alternative x over alternative y if W(x) -
W(y). See KAUSHIKBASU, REVEALED PREFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT 59 (1980).
Id.
31 This assumption should not imply that those consumers living in the city are
irrational. There are those who choose to live in the city because the services provided
(including culture and commerce) mesh with their individual choice. Furthermore,
there are those who live in the city because they cannot afford the suburbs. In the
former case, the city consumer's choice is rational decisionmaking in the same man-
ner as those who choose the suburbs. In the latter case, the consumer's "choice" is not
irrational, but rather made in response to market constraint.
32 Rousseau, supra note 1, at 196.
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decisions that affect one's life."3 At the risk of "mobiliz[ing] resonant
Jeffersonian imagery,"34 the need to find meaningful participation in
the political process underlies the very existence of a democratic gov-
ernment.35 The smaller the political community, the more likely a resi-
dent will see an impact of her political voice. Furthermore, the greater
impact a resident feels her voice has, the more likely she will be to use
it.sr
In her desire to have an impact, a consumer looks for a government
where her political voice will not be drowned in a sea of dissent. She
seeks smaller and more homogeneous political communities. At some
point, the size of local governments may dip below the minimum size
capable of providing all the necessary services.37 Size of community,
however, is not only an outcome of the consumer's choice, but also a
factor in that choice. A consumer looks for political impact, but there
is also an implicit willingness to trade personal political power for the
desired mix of services.
Political motivations, however, go beyond a romantic view of par-
ticipatory democracy. A real division of governmental power through-
out communities in the region "may contribute to the fundamental ob-
jectives of a modem democratic state" including "liberty, equality and
welfare. "38 Some commentators contend that smaller governments
33Frug, supra note 2, at 1068 (citing HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 114-15,
119-20 (1962) and discussing Arendt's concept of "public freedom").
34 Williams, supra note 3, at 105.
35 See Letter from the Federal Farmer to the Republican (Oct. 12, 1787), in THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION FOR AND AGAINST 33-34 (".R. Pole ed., 1987) ("[W]hen
power is transferred from the many to the few, all changes become extremely diffi-
cult .... ").
For a discussion of the intersections of exit, voice and loyalty, see ALBERT 0.
HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970).
37 See Voting Rights, supra note 3, at 828 (discussing a solution to this size problem).
Political theorists conclude that a neighborhood should range from 50,000 to no more
than 200,000 inhabitants to maximize democratic participation. See, e.g., Robert Dahl,
The City in the Future of Democracy, 61 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 953, 967 (1967) (suggesting
that the "optimum size for a city [is] the range.., from 50 thousand to about 200
thousand"); Douglas Yates, Neighborhood Government, in NEIGHBORHOODS IN URBAN
AMERICA 131, 138 (Ronald H. Bayor ed., 1982) ("Democratic theorists argue that a
city... should probably contain no more than 200,000 residents if anything remotely
like direct democracy is to exist." (emphasis omitted)). I submit that the ideal size is
closer to 50,000 for social reasons.
38 Wood, supra note 8, at 53 (describing the views of Ylvisaker regarding the ends
served by an areal division of power); see also Big Country Foods, Inc. v. Board of Educ.,
952 F.2d 1173, 1179 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[L]ocal control fosters both administrative effi-
ciency and democratic governance."); Voting Rights, supra note 3, at 823 ("The debate
over the appropriate structure for metropolitan governance has been informed by
1997]
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function more efficiently." The benefit for the consumer, though, is
not solely an economic consideration. In her quest for the ideal gov-
ernment, a consumer considers the manner in which government func-
tions. She looks for a government where the decisions will be predict-
able and orderly. Instead of the normative "should" inquiry of
democratic ideals and political participation, the consumer's functional
analysis focuses on the instrumental "how."
Such a functional analysis of local government is certainly not40
new. Functional analysis, however, permits us to analyze local gov-
ernment choice not only as choice between political goals but also as
choice between political systems. Governmental structure is not an in-
cidental by-product of local government. Just as procedural and sub-
stantive law are crucial to litigation, so too are structure and policy cen-
tral to choice of a political community. Is the structure removed from
the people (e.g., strong mayor)? Is power diffuse (e.g., weak mayor
with strong local council)? The mode of government is as important as
the manner.
The political impetus behind the shift to the suburbs can thus be
traced to the search for a meaningful voice in the political process. The
consumer can feel the importance of her voice satisfying the desire for
political impact and participation. Furthermore, the functional struc-
ture of the government matters. In contrast to the hulking bureaucracy
of many large city governments, suburban governments are smaller
and, perhaps, more personal. The political explanation for the shift to
the suburbs rests on the consumer's pursuit of these two goals.
C. Social Motivation
Scholars cite many social factors behind the move to the sub-
concerns for efficiency, equity, and democracy.").
39 See, e.g., Our Localism: Part II, supra note 3, at 402 (noting the view of some ur-
ban economists that interlocal competition between fragmented and overlapping local
governments promotes efficiency); Richard Briffault, The Role of Local Control in School
Finance Reform, 24 CONN. L. REV. 778, 791 (1992) ("Economists have suggested that
economies of scale turn into diseconomies once a government unit grows past a cer-
tain size."); cf Steven C. Deller, An Application of a Test forAllocativeEfficiency in the Local
Public Sector, 20 REGIONAL Sci. & URB. ECON. 895, 406 (1990) ("[A] higher level of
fragmentation in local public good provision is positively capitalized into total prop-
erty values.").
40 For an historical analysis of the links between the functional requirements of
government and governmental spatial reform, see Wood, supra note 8, at 59.
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urbs, including racial strife, 1 'housing styles, proximity to work via new
interstate highways43 and government-subsidized mortgages." These
social motivations inject the serendipity of human nature and personal-
ity into our discussion. When a consumer chooses among an array of
local government choices she makes more than a political or economic
choice. The consumer chooses a lifestyle and gives in to the natural
human tendency toward social factionalization. David Hume, the Scot-
tish philosopher, discussed the natural tendency for humans to sepa-
rate into factions: "Men have such a propensity to divide into personal
factions that the smallest appearance of real difference will produce
them."4
The social consequence of choice is that communities "possess[] a
moral as well as a physical organization, and these two mutually interact
in characteristic ways to mold and modify [each other]."45 If commu-
41 See CAROLYN ADAMS ET AL., PHILADELPHIA: NEIGHBORHOODS, DIVISION, AND
CONFLICT IN A POSTINDUSTRIAL CITY 83 (Joe T. Darden ed., 1991) (describing "white
flight" from the city of Philadelphia). But see LEVEN & MARK, supra note 20, at 3
("[The] median income of its population, not racial composition, is the most relevant
neighborhood characteristic in determining the willingness to pay for,a particular
unit."); Georgette C. Poindexter, Locational Perception: City Versus Suburban Home-
Buying Preference, 16 LAW & POL'Y 473, 481 (1994) (questioning the "importance of ra-
cial homogeneity as a primary motivational factor" in the move to the suburbs).
42 See Poindexter, supra note 41, at 480 (finding that style of home is the most im-
portant factor affecting suburban residents' choice of neighborhood); see also
SUZANNE KELLER, CREATING COMMUNITY: THE ROLE OF LAND, SPACE, AND PLACE 7
(1986) (noting a significant increase in the number of homeowners who mentioned a
detached house as a significant ingredient of an ideal community).
43 The interstate highway system funded by the federal government provides a web
of roads that facilitates travel between the city and the suburbs, allowing workers to
live in the suburbs while working in the city. See Brian J. O'Connell, The Federal Role in
the Suburban Boom, in SUBURBIA RE-EXAMINED 183, 187-88 (Barbara M. Kelly ed., 1989).
4The Federal Housing Authority (FHA) insures home loans to qualified borrow-
ers, thus eliminating the lender's risk and providing lenders with an incentive to make
mortgage loans. In the post-World War II period, however, FHA lending criteria re-
sulted in a pronounced preference in lending for new construction rather than for
existing structures. Because new construction tended to be in the suburbs rather than
in the city, the program encouraged suburban growth to the detriment of city growth.
See id. at 189-90; see also KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBUR-
BANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 190-218 (1985) (noting that consumer choices
were subsidized by federal government policies that pushed people out of the cities
while pulling them into the suburbs).
45 DAVID HUME, 1 ESSAYS: MORAL, POLTICAL, AND LITERARY 128 (T.H. Green &
T.H. Grose eds., London, Longmans, Green & Co. 1875), quoted in Douglass Adair,
That Politics May be Reduced to a Scienc4 20 HUNTINGTON LIBR. Q. 343 (1957), reprinted
in FAME AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: ESSAYS BY DOUGLAS ADAIR 93, 103 (Trevor Col-
bourn ed., 1974).
4ROBERT EZRA PARK, HUMAN COMMUNITIES: THE CY AND HUMAN ECOLOGY 16
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nity is our "bulwark against all sorts of alien influences, a sort of security
perimeter,, 47 then our revealed choice is as much about where we want
to be as where we do not want to be.48
Why, socially, have Americans chosen the suburbs? The quick an-
swer is tied to racial strife. Social relations are inevitably correlated
with spatial relations.50 Because spatial relations in this country have
historically been limited by race and ethnicity,51 social motivations are
imbued with the patina of racial/ethnic exclusion. Hence, a superficial
discussion of social motivation leaves much to be desired. Social moti-
vation can imply an element of exclusion that is quite unsettling in a
society purportedly striving toward pluralism.
However, the quick answer is not necessarily the complete answer.
Although certainly neither denying nor discounting America's history
of racial and ethnic housing discrimination,5 2 I submit that our analysis
cannot stop at "white flight." Historically, planners and architects at-
tempted to create communities built upon strengthening social rela-
tionships.53 The ascent of the neotraditional planning movement, with
its shared open space and front porches, signals a desire to reconnect
(1952). Park's animation of the city, giving it life, allows us to conceptualize commu-
nity as an organic being, capable of change from within. Park goes so far as to liken
the city to a super-organism as in plant ecology: "[P]lants and animals, living together
in a common habitat, invariably tend to develop a natural economy and to form, as an
incident of such economic interdependence, a biotic community in which the differ-
ent species are able to live more securely and prosperously together than they can
apart." Id. at 119; see also Phillip L. Clay, Choosing Urban Futures: The Transformation of
American Cities, 1 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 28, 29 (1989) ("It begins with the proposition
that cities are organic entities with a capacity for renewal, notjust decline.").
47 GREGORYR. WEIHER, THE FRACTURED METROPOLIS: POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION
AND METROPOLITAN SEGREGATION 37 (1991).
48 For example, the rise in the number of gated communities indicates not only a
choice to live in that community, but also an explicit choice to keep other communi-
ties separate.
4 See ADAMS ET AL., supra note 41, at 93-98 ("[T]he white population.., despite
the presence of a sizable black population in its midst, has managed to maintain its
neighborhoods as predominantly white enclaves in both city and suburbs.").50
See PARK, supra note 46, at 177 ("[S]ocial status ... turns out finally to be a mat-
ter of... social distance."). A person from the neighborhood is not treated with the
same suspicion an outsider engenders when both walk into the neighborhood bar.
Exclusion has been both informal (as in Chinatown, Little Italy and Harlem)
and explicit (as in deed restrictions). For a discussion of the formal exclusion, see in-
fra Part III (discussing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1947)).
See infra Part III (discussing the history of racial and ethnic discrimination in
housing).
53 See Suzanne Keller, The Neighborhood, in NEIGHBORHOODS IN URBAN AMERICA,
supra note 37, at 8, 18 (arguing that planners' justification for designing spatial subdi-
visions in large urban areas is to "help promote local utilization of services and indi-
rectly encourage other local attachments and loyalties").
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with our surroundings. 4
The move to the suburbs is an attempt to find a comfortable so-
cial situation." Call it the "good life" or the "clean life," people are
looking for the house with the yard in a safe neighborhood.5 Par-
ents' concern for the health and safety of their children motivates
them to move to the suburbs. As one urban planner has noted:
Children are like the canaries in the coal mine: an indicator species
of urban health. Children are small and vulnerable and need to be pro-
tected. If a city lacks children, then it is because parents have assessed
the environment and have decided.., to remove to a safer place. But
where parents won't raise children, we might all hesitate to live, for such
a place presents an environment uncomfortable, noisy, and dangerous.57
D. Suburban Shift as Self-Definition in the Creation of the Collective
Individual
Community choice, then, depends on: (1) affordable services; (2)
a government in which an individual has a voice and that functions ac-
cording to expectation; and (3) a community in which the consumer
feels socially comfortable. In effect, revealed preference is intimately
bound up with the search for self. Our economic, political and social
motivations for seeking community are all related to finding geo-
graphic and spatial harmony with ourselves. We need to connect with
our surroundings in order to validate and secure ourselves. The socio-
centric side of our development requires that we belong to a commu-
The interesting facet of neotraditional planning is that it attempts to recreate in
the suburbs the "neighborhood" feel of the city in days gone by. How ironic that the
social connection that people seek is a "city" feel that now is by and large confined to
the suburbs.
53 See HERBERTJ. GANS, THE LEVITTOWNERS 40 (1967) ("[A]bout 95 percent of
[Levittowners] ... hoped for improved individual, family, and social life .... ."). But see
Howard Pack & Janet Rothenberg Pack, Metropolitan Fragmentation and Suburban Homo-
geneity, 14 URB. STUD. 191, 191 (1977) (noting that the extent of homogeneity in
Pennsylvania suburbs, as determined by age, education, occupation, income and mari-
tal status of head of household, was actually more limited than is generally believed).
The authors noted, however, that:
[Tihe absence of realised homogeneity casts little light on the validity of
the underlying behavioural assumption that a desire to live with others of
similar background and circumstance is an important feature of social life.
Indeed, such desires may be fundamental but their realisation is limited by a
number of complicating factors.
Id.
56 See KELLER, supra note 42, at 2.
7 DAVID SUCHER, CITY COMFORTs: HOWTo BUILD AN URBAN VILLAGE 65 (1995).
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nity, while our egocentric side demands that this community conform
with our definition of self.5s Although there may be a tendency to use
government at all levels to define the individual, 5' local governments,
through the existence of choice, allow for the fullest expression of self. "
A word of caution is in order. We should be careful not to confuse
the community's definition of the individual with the individual's defi-
nition of the community. 1 Community definition is the sum of the ag-
gregate individual self-definitions. It changes with the residents of the
community. As the community attracts residents, these individuals de-
fine the community.6 2 Only by first analyzing the process of individual
self-definition can we then explore that of community self-definition.
The power of definition rests with the individual; the community is but
a reflection of its residents' individualities.
Professor Briffault argues that localism exists when "the interests of
local residents [are] the exclusive desideratum of local decision mak-
ers." 3 He further states that localism "leads to an association of the lo-
38 See Shan Guisinger & SidneyJ. Blatt, Individuality and Relatedness: Evolution of a
FundamentalDialectic, 49 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 104, 104 (1994) ("[S]ocial interest may be
as necessary as self-interest to survival."). A mature sense of self is contingent on in-
terpersonal relationships. On the other hand, the continued development of increas-
ingly mature interpersonal relationships is contingent on mature self-definition.
There must be a balanced development of both dimensions. See id. at 109.
59 For example, there is certainly national patriotism ("American, and proud of
it") and state pride ("Texan").
60 There are over 86,000 units of local government in the United States. SeeJohn
Kincaid, Regulatory Regionalism in Metropolitan Areas: Voter Resistance and Reform Persis-
tence 13 PACE L. REV. 449, 450 (1993) (noting that the existence of 86,692 units of lo-
cal government has resulted in extreme governmental differentiation, especially
within metropolitan areas). Contrast that number with the choice of 50 state govern-
ments.
61 Professor Ford refers to community self-definition as tautological because of ra-
cially restrictive entrance barriers. See Ford, supra note 3, at 1860 ("[A]Ithough the
governance of... an association may be democratic in form, it may well not be demo-
cratic... in substance if the initial selection of members was highly exclusive."). I
disagree. While the imposition of racially restrictive barriers may serve to entrench
and strengthen the status quo in a community, barriers are but a tool used to create
the definition. To say that "we are a community of white, upper middle-class, single-
family homeowners" may be racially and economically exclusionary, but it certainly is
not tautological.
62This is not to imply, however, that community definition can be accomplished
only by looking within the community. As Professor Frug has written, "the autono-
mous individual has to be interested in others, not as a matter of sentimentality or al-
truism but as a matter of self-interest." Frug, supra note 3, at 274. Just as the individ-
ual will be interested in other individuals, so will the local community be interested in
other local communities.
Our Localism: Part 1, supra note 3, at 444.
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cality with individual autonomy."r" These definitions put the relevance
of the distinction between individual and community decisionmaking
into focus. The "community," standing alone, is powerless. It derives
its power from the individuals who reside within itr5 Hence, the com-
munity is a collective individual The power and limitations of the collec-
tive individual constitute the power of the community.
The idea of the community as a collective individual rejects the top-
down definition of an inhabitant through her community. For exam-
ple, during common cocktail chit-chat we often pose the question:
Where do you live? The response to the question (city or suburbs, rich
neighborhood or poor) defines the respondent. We rarely discover if
the individual really is rich or poor; we simply make assumptions based
upon her residence. This spatial definition of the individual also occurs
in government policymaking. For example, the federal government
through its agency, The Home Owners' Loan Corporation, red lined
minority neighborhoods. "Red lining" describes the arbitrary denial of
loans in certain neighborhoods on the basis of assumptions about the
quality of the neighborhood rather than the creditworthiness of the
applicant or the nature of the property." Although loan applicants may
have been creditworthy, banks and federal agencies made assumptions
about them based upon their neighborhood, preventing loan ap-
proval.
67
6Id.
This characteristic is the basis of a truly republican government. In discussing
the "distinctive characters" of the republican form of government, Madison stated, "we
may define a republic to be... a government which derives all its powers directly or
indirectly from the great body of the people." THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 255 (James
Madison) (Isaac Kremnick ed., 1987).
SeeJACKSON, supra note 44, at 362.
The Home Owners' Loan Corporation (created pursuant to the Home Owners'
Loan Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-43, 48 Stat. 128 (1933)) directed the flow of home
mortgage capital. HOLC carved the national housing market into four classifications
when it drew up confidential color-coded "Residential Security Maps f Id. at 199.
These maps were then used to determine whether credit would be extended to an ap-
plicant from a particular neighborhood.
The color-coding system placed a lower value on areas in which Jews, Blacks and
other minorities resided. The first category, A or green, was most highly valued.
These areas were white, homogenous, desirable neighborhoods. The second group, B
or blue, consisted of stable, but declining neighborhoods. The neighborhoods in the
third level, C or yellow, were already in decline, and the fourth, D or red (hence "red
lining"), contained the least desirable areas. See id. at 197-98.
Interestingly, the opposite appears to be occurring today. Although people are
still defined by their neighborhoods, rigorous enforcement of the Community Rede-
velopment Act produced a whirlwind of lending activity in historically minority com-
munities. SeeJacqueline Simmons, Home Prices Soar in Unexpected Places, WALL ST. J.,
19971
624 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANA LAWREVIEW
Viewing the community as a collective individual, by contrast, is a
bottom-up approach. The community is an agglomeration of individu-
als. Self-definition of individual inhabitants comes first. The sum of
these self-definitions then defines the community. Collective individu-
alism questions our assumption that spatial identity is a proxy for indi-
vidual identity. To be sure, since people search for themselves in their
community, there will continue to be some overlap between community
and individual definitions. However, freedom from the strictures of
spatial identity allows us to rethink the basis of local government power.
Instead of asking what is the power of the community, we need to ask
what is the power of the individual, for the power of the collective indi-
vidual is the power of the community.
II. THE MOLDING OF POLITICAL POWER AROUND
THE COLLECTIVE INDIVIDUAL
As Cato concluded every speech with the words, Carthago delenda est, so
do I every opinion, with the injunction "divide the counties into
wards." 6
The decentralized "politics of [local government] boundary crea-
tion are uniquely American."69 In the United States, local governments
control the delineation of boundaries. In contrast, "[i]n the United
Kingdom, communities wishing to incorporate must petition an agency
of national government. ' 7' Alexis de Tocqueville traced this desire for
decentralized government to our historical pre-Revolutionary equality
among citizens.7 In a society where revolution is preceded by a rela-
tively egalitarian state, there is a desire for more decentralized govern-
ment. In contrast, people who have had to struggle for equality prefer
a centralized government because a strong central government pre-
Feb. 13, 1996, at A2 ("If it were not for CRA, nobody would be getting these loans, and
houses would not be selling at these amounts.").
68RICHARD K. MATTHEWS, THE RADICAL POLITICS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: A
REVISIONIST VIEW 87 (1984) (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph C.
Cabell (Feb. 2, 1816)).
69 WEIHER, supra note 47, at 165.
70 This feature is in sharp contrast to other nations where "[u]rban development
and local government formation ... are integrated into national policy." Id. For a
comparative study of local government structure in 20 Western industrialized coun-
tries, see LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND URBAN AFFAIRS IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
(JoachimJ. Hesse ed., 1990).
71 WEIHER, supra note 47, at 3.
See DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 11, at 297. Of course, citizens were defined as
white male landowners.
[Vol. 145:607
DECONSTRUCTING THE LEGAL CITY
vents a transfer of power to the elite.73
The fracturing of local government is a basic concept in American
government. Indeed, since the time of the Founding Fathers there has
been a search for the optimally sized government for the American
people. Because of this distrust of centralized government, Jefferson
sought "not to trust it all to one, but to divide it among the many, dis-
tributing to everyone exactly the functions he is competent to. 7 4 Jeffer-
son's goal was to "dissolve[] [government] into the unity of soci-
ety .... [by] republicanism, decentralization, and specialization. 75 In
an attempt to bring government to the people, Jefferson's political
wards would form a direct attachment between citizens and their gov-
ernments and would "attach [the citizen] by his strongest feelings to
the independence of his country, and its republican constitution."a
The present fractured state of local government, then, should come
as no surprise. Its creation was not happenstance,77 but rather a delib-
erate attempt to empower the individual. Perhaps the question of the
validity of such fracturing can be explained by exploring the notion
that local government, while seeking to protect the individual from the
state is, in fact, itself created by the state. Professor Frug calls this rela-
tionship among localities, individuals and the state the "principal puz-
zle confronted by liberal theorists":78 "Cities were partly creations of the
state, yet they were also partly creations of the individuals who lived
73 See id. De Tocqueville states:
It may be remarked, that, at the present day, the lower orders in England
are striving with all their might to destroy local independence, and to transfer
the administration from all the points of the circumference to the centre;
whereas the higher classes are endeavoring to retain this administration
within its ancient boundaries. I venture to predict that a time will come when
the very reverse will happen.
Id.
74MATrHEWS, supra note 68, at 82 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Jo-
seph C. Cabell (Feb. 2, 1816)).
Samuel P. Huntington, The Founding Fathers and the Division of Powers, in AREA
AND POWER supra note 8, at 150, 162.
7GMATrHEWS, supra note 68, at 77 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Sam-
uel Kercheval (July 12, 1816)). According to Federalists such as Madison who viewed a
large republic as a surer bastion of liberty, factionalism threatened purely democratic
government. But see THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 128 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick
ed., 1987) ("Hence, it clearly appears that the same advantage which a republic has
over a democracy in controlling the effect of faction is enjoyed by a large over a small
republic-is enjoyed by the union over the states composing it.").
See WEIHER, supra note 47, at 179 ("[T]he proliferation of governments in the
United States did not occur by divine fiat.").
78 Frug, supra note 2, at 1076.
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within them."79 The tension in empowering local govemment is that
such power is always at the will of the state, not at the will of the people
as a romanticJeffersonian view presumes. Where local govemment has
been empowered, it has been by action of the state. 0
However, we cannot simply rely on the notion that "[m]unicipal
corporations are political subdivisions of the State, created as conven-
ient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the
State as may be entrusted to them."s. Municipalities are more than
governmental units. Local governments, by creating easily recognizable
boundaries within a region, serve as proxies for socioeconomic status,
race, lifestyle. They are no more mere subdivisions of the state than
children are mere subdivisions of their parents. Admittedly, in both in-
stances the superior being has the ability to force the inferior being to
act against the inferior's wishes. The inferior being, however, still pos-
sesses its own identity independent of the superior being.
The law sometimes chooses to hang municipal power on this inde-
pendent spirit of local governments. In areas where individuality is en-
couraged, local governments are empowered. These are the areas such
as "home and family" and "community,"8 2 where a distinct local identity
is formulated.83 This identity, in turn, distinguishes one locale from
79 Id.
80For examples, see the New York and Pennsylvania home-rule statutes, N.Y. MUN.
HOME RULE LAW § 50 (McKinney 1994); Act of Dec 19, 1996, ch. 29, 1996 Pa. Legis.
Serv. 177 (West) (to be codified at 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2961) ("A municipality
which has adopted a home rule charter may exercise any powers and perform any
function not denied by the Constitution of Pennsylvania, by statute or by its home rule
charter."). Although calling for grants of municipal power to be "liberally construed
in favor of the municipality," such power is given by the state to local government-
not taken by municipalities from the state. Id. Also, "local governments have no fed-
eral constitutional rights against their states and local residents have no constitutional
claim to belong to particular local government." Voting Rights, supra note 3, at 792
n.90 (discussing Staten Island's obstacles to achieving secession).
81 Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907), overruled on other grounds
by Baldwin v. Winston-Salem, 710 F.2d 132 (4th Cir. 1983).
82 See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding a local ordi-
nance restricting land use to single family dwellings); see also Frug, supra note 3, at 265
(discussing cases in which the Supreme Court has upheld local government authority
to regulate community issues). Recently, the Eighth Circuit held that the City of St.
Louis's interest in decreasing congestion and noise in residential areas was a rational
basis for restricting single family dwellings to eight or fewer unrelated persons. See Ox-
ford House-C v. City of St. Louis, 77 F.3d 249, 252 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
65 (1996) ("Cities have a legitimate interest in decreasing congestion, traffic, and
noise in residential areas, and ordinances restricting the number of unrelated people
who may occupy a single family residence are reasonably related to these legitimate
goals.").
83 But see Williams, supra note 3, at 119 (citing the protection of property values,
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another, even though they are in the same state. "Political boundaries
are manifestations of the widespread recognition of place, a spatial unit
with its own identity, separate and recognizable from other spatial
units.""
The independence of local government, however, is not unlimited.
Local governments--themselves distinct political entities-coexist with
other local governments in the region and the state.85 Furthermore, al-
though the state law respects the independence of local government, it
limits this independence when it conflicts with state goals. The tension
between the independence of local government and state intrusions
upon that independence parallels the tension between the independ-
ence of individuals and state intrusions upon individual autonomy.86
In order to gain a clearer understanding of the power of local gov-
ernments we should compare instances in which the courts have up-
held the independence of local government with those in which courts
have disregarded local government boundaries. Polar definitions or
concepts are of little value when attempting to find a practical, work-
able solution. To state that localism "lead [s] to an association of the lo-
cality with individual autonomy" 7 does not determine at what point
autonomy works for the good of all. Likewise, "Dillon's Rule," which
states that local governments have only those powers that are specifi-
and not home and family, as the impetus for deference to local autonomy).
84 WEIHER, supra note 47, at 166.
85 The clearest judicial declarations on this theory are the Mount Laurel cases. See
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 727-
28 (NJ. 1975) (Mount Laurel 1) ("[T]he general welfare which developing municipali-
ties.., must consider extends beyond their boundaries and cannot be parochially
confined to the claimed good of the particular municipality."); Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d. 390, 422-35 (N.J. 1983)
(Mount Laurel1l) (instructing municipalities to coordinate development of low income
housing projects to conform to a state plan); Hills Dev. Co. v. Township of Bernards,
510 A.2d 621, 632 (N.J. 1986) (Mount Laurel III) (upholding the constitutionality of
the Fair Housing Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-301 to -329 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996),
New Jersey's legislative response to the previous Mount Laurel which enables munici-
palities to determine "what is required [of) them").
86 In essence, this is a privacy argument. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973)
("The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. In a line of deci-
sions ... the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of
certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution."); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (discussing different zones of privacy); see also
Williams, supra note 3, at 85 (analyzing theories of local government law offered by
Cooley, Dillon,Justice Brennan and the Burger Court majority, and finding a pattern:
"each author's theory of city status is closely linked with his desire to rein in excessive
governmental power" although each one sees different "nightmares of government
run amok").
87OurLocalism: Part II, supra note 3, at 444.
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cally granted by constitution or statute, or that arise by implication from
an express grant of power,8s gives no guidance as to the breadth and
depth of such power. By comparing instances of state power respecting
local autonomy and individuality with examples of state power sup-
pressing such individuality, we begin to cut a finer definition of the
power of local governments and their place in political structure.s  I
will examine three areas in which this tension has existed: 1) imposi-
tion of inter-local remedies, 2) manipulation of municipal boundaries,
and 3) voting rights.
A. Housing vs. Schools: Gautreaux, Milliken and Their Progeny
Both housing and schools invoke notions of community spirit,
home and family. If the power of local boundaries were centered solely
on a Rockwellian ideal, then local boundaries would be respected in
both areas. The state, however, has a clear interest in both housing and
schools that could trample local boundaries in both instances. How,
then, have the courts treated the existence of local boundaries in these
two situations?
Hills v. Gautreaux ° and Milliken v. Bradley' addressed the racial and
economic externalities brought about by "white flight" from the city to
the suburbs. In Gautreaux, black tenants and applicants for Chicago
public housing claimed that the Chicago Housing Authority ("CHA")
and the United States Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment ("HUD") were guilty of racial discrimination in public housing.
They sought a metropolitan-wide remedy to the discriminatory place-
92ment of public housing projects. In Milliken, parents of black school
children in Detroit claimed that the Detroit public school system was
racially segregated. They likewise sought a metropolitan-wide remedy
88 SeeJOHN F. DILLON, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
449, 448-451 (5th ed. 1911) ("[A] municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the follow-
ing powers and no others: First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or
fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the
accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the corporation-not simply
convenient, but indispensable.").
89 See Williams, supra note 3, at 85 (noting that since cities "have no set place in
American constitutional structure... courts and commentators have been able to re-
define city status without the textual constraints that limit reformulations of the status
of the state and federal governments").
90 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
91 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (Milliken 1).
92 See Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 286-92.
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to open suburban schools to city children.93 In Gautreaux, the United
States Supreme Court held that a metropolitan-wide remedy was ap-
propriate.'J4 In Milliken, the Court ruled that such a remedy was inap-
propriate. '
The divergent remedies applied in these two cases are not
grounded in whether local boundaries may be ignored when some-
one's constitutional rights have been infringed. Both cases clearly held
that local boundaries "may be bridged where there has been a constitu-
tional violation"g" and that such lines are "not sacrosanct and if they
conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment federal courts have a duty to
prescribe appropriate remedies.0 7 Rather, the difference lay in who
committed the constitutional violation and to whom the remedy was
addressed. 9
In the housing case, the defendants (HUD and CHA) created the
racial discrimination."" In response, the Court ordered HUD and CHA
to disregard local boundaries.'00 In the education case, the Court found
no evidence that the suburban school district defendants had created
the racial discrimination.Y As a result, the Court declined to approve a
metropolitan-wide remedy "that would reach beyond the limits of the
city of Detroit to correct a constitutional violation found to have oc-
curred solely within that city."'
0 2
Note that even though the state of Michigan controlled the school
districts, the Milliken Court rejected the reasoning of the Court of Ap-
93 See Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 721-30.
94 See Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 305-06.
95 See Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 752-53. However, the Supreme Court did uphold a
lower court ruling implementing a city-based desegregation plan in Milliken v. Bradley,
433 U.S. 267, 291 (1976) (Milliken Ii).
96 Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 741; see also Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 300 (stating that local
boundaries should not become "an arbitrary and mechanical shield for those found to
have engaged in unconstitutional conduct").
97 Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 744; see also Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 298 ("Nothing in the
Milliken decision suggests a perse rule that Federal courts lack authority to order parties
found to have violated the Constitution to undertake remedial efforts beyond the mu-
nicipal boundaries of the city where the violation occurred.").
"The critical distinction between HUD and the suburban school districts in Mil-
liken is that HUD has been found to have violated the Constitution." Gautreaux, 425
U.S. at 297.
99 See Gautreaux; 425 U.S. at 296 ("HUD does not dispute the Court of Appeals' de-
termination that it violated the Fifth Amendment and § 601 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 ....").
oo See id. at 298.
101 See Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 745.
ir Id. at 757 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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peals that such control, coupled with de jure acts of discrimination by
the state of Michigan, was enough to warrant implementation of a met-
ropolitan-wide remedy.103 The Court required an interdistrict violation
tojustify an interdistrict remedy. As the Court stated in Gautreaux
The District Court's desegregation order in Milliken was held to be
an impermissible remedy not because it envisioned relief against a
wrongdoer extending beyond the city in which the violation occurred
but because it contemplated a judicial decree restructuring the opera-
tion of local governmental entities that were not implicated in any con-
stitutional violation.
10 4
This principle that discriminatory acts control the availability of a
regional remedy remains the bright-line rule. Where school district
boundaries are drawn for the purpose of "aiding and implementing"
racial segregation, an interdistrict remedy may be imposed.'05 In addi-
tion, courts will uphold voluntary desegregation agreements that cross
school district boundaries.' 0 However, the constitutional violation will
not be inferred; there must be proof of such violation. 1 7 In its most re-
cent ruling on this subject, the Supreme Court held that "white flight"
does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation that will mandate
103 See id. at 734-36 (describing the ruling of the court of appeals).
104 Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 296.
105 Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 510 F.2d 1358, 1360 (6th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977); see also Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428,
432 (D. Del. 1975), affd, 423 U.S. 963 (1975) ("[T]o the extent that segregation im-
posed by state law has had inter-district effects, federal courts can fashion appropriate
inter-district remedies.").
106 SeeLiddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294, 1305 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
816 (1984). The court was definite, however, as to the impact of a constitutional viola-
tion in its willingness to uphold the settlement agreement: "We make it clear, how-
ever, that no party found to have violated the Constitution will be permitted to escape
its obligation to provide equal educational opportunity to the black children of St.
Louis." Id. at 1297.
107 "Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause." Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) (finding no "invidious purpose" behind
denial of rezoning request to build low-income housing). The Court in Arlington
Heights reaffirmed the position taken in Washington v. Davis that an action is not un-
constitutional "solely because it results in racially disproportionate impact," Arlington
Heights, 429 U.S. at 265, although proof of disproportionate impact can be used to
prove invidious racial discrimination "because in various circumstances the discrimina-
tion is very difficult to explain on nonracial grounds." Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229, 242 (1976). But seeUnited States v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 637 F.2d 1101, 1106-
08 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980) (holding that state's long history of
racial discrimination was a significant factor in establishing discriminatory purpose).
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an interdistrict remedy.'
The distinctions made are clearer if we view local governments as
extensions of the individual. As de Tocqueville noted: "the township,
taken as a whole, and in relation to the central government is only an
individual ... ."'09 The power of local government is no more and no
less than the collective power of the individuals residing in that mu-
nicipality. The recognition of local boundaries is premised upon the
recognition of the rights of the individual. In Milliken I, the Court de-
clined to grant a remedy that would force action by individuals (the
suburban school districts) who had committed no constitutional viola-
tions. An individual who has not committed any wrong should not be
made to remedy the wrongs of others."0 In contrast, in Gautreaux, the
Court ordered the party who had committed the constitutional viola-
tion to remedy the violation. There was no requirement that non-
violating individuals (the suburban municipalities) take affirmative re-
medial steps."'
B. Annexation and Other Manipulations of Municipal Boundaries
The ability to reify or to mutate municipal boundaries upon the will
of the people is the ultimate form of self-definition. Legal limitations
on such change parallel legal limitations on the ability of the individual
to define herself within both government and society. For example,
annexation, with limited exceptions, can occur only with the consent of
those residing in the area to be annexed."2 Just as one individual can-
not force another into marriage, one municipality cannot force another
into a merger without consent. The requirement of voluntary annexa-
tion is rooted in principles of self-determination and fundamental fair-
108 Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2052 (1995). Even upon finding that a
school districting scheme was unconstitutional, the Connecticut Supreme Court de-
clined to impose an interjurisdictional remedy and instead deferred to the legislature.
SeeSheffv. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1290-91 (Conn. 1996).
109 DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 11, at 58.110 See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974) (Milliken 1) ("[W]ithout an in-
terdistrict violation and interdistrict effect, there is no constitutional wrong calling for
an interdistrict remedy.").
1 See Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 298 (1976) ("Here, 'unlike the desegrega-
tion remedy found erroneous in Milliken, a judicial order directing relief beyond the
boundary lines of Chicago will not necessarily entail coercion of uninvolved govern-
mental units....").
112 See Laurie Reynolds, Rethinking Municipal Annexation Powers, 24 URB. LAW. 247,
247 (1992).
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113ness.
This power of self-determination, however, is only effective as
against other municipalities. Beginning with Hunter v. City of Pitts-
burgh!4 and moving forward,"s the state has had the power, at its pleas-
ure, to "expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a
part of it with another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the
corporation.""' The municipality's rights as against those of other mu-
nicipalities are coextensive with the rights that one individual has
against another. A municipality's rights as against the state (or as
against the federal government) extend only as far as an individual's
rights against the state (or federal government). Like an individual
who has no constitutional right to live in a particular local jurisdic-
tion, ' 7 a municipal government has no right to exist if the state decides
otherwise." 8
Furthermore, just as private parties cannot contract to violate the
fundamental rights of another,"9 two municipalities cannot consolidate
with impunity in a way that abridges an individual's fundamental
rights. 12 The clearest example of a violation of fundamental rights in
113 See id. at 248 (citing People ex reL Leland Grove v. Springfield, 520 N.E.2d 1205,
1209 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) ("[Flundamental fairness dictates that the property owner
must be allowed to choose between the several municipalities vested with annexation
jurisdiction....")).
14 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
115 See, e.g., Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 71 (1978) ("While
the broad statements as to state control have undoubtedly been qualified.., we think
that [Hunter] continues to have substantial constitutional significance in emphasizing
the extraordinarily wide latitude that States have in creating various types of political
subdivisions and conferring authority upon them."); Township of Jefferson v. City of
West Carrollton, 517 F. Supp. 417, 419 (S.D. Ohio 1981), affa, 718 F.2d 1099 (6th Cir.
1983) (table) ("Hunter ... still reflects the viable principle of law that annexation mat-
ters fall entirely within the discretion and standards of the state constitution ...
116 Hunter, 207 U.S. at 178-79.
117 See id. at 179 (noting that a state may modify a municipality in any way,
"unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution of the United States").
11 Furthermore, there is no absolute right under the Due Process Clause to vote
on proposed alterations to municipal boundaries. See id., 207 U.S. at 179 (stating that
alterations may be made "conditionally or unconditionally, with or without the con-
sent of the citizens, or even against their protest"); Adams v. City of Colorado Springs,
308 F. Supp. 1397, 1400 n.3 (D. Colo. 1970), af'd, 399 U.S. 901 (1970) ("The state
therefore, at its pleasure, may... expand or contract the territorial area, unite the
whole or a part of it .... with or without the consent of the citizens . . . ."), affd mem.,
399 U.S. 901 (1970).
119 See discussion infra Part III.
120 See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 345 (1960) (holding that the Fifteenth
Amendment prevents a state from manipulating political subdivisions so as to defeat
the federally protected right to vote); City of Port Arthur v. United States, 459 U.S. 159
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this context is dilution of voting power.' Although not all expansions
of municipal borders that dilute the voting power of particular groups
are prohibited, such dilution must be addressed and ameliorated.'2 To
summarize, the rights of the municipality as against the state and fed-
eral government extend no further than the rights of the individual as
against the government.
In the same vein, a municipality cannot secede if such a secession
abridges a citizen's fundamental rights. For example, courts have con-
sistently blocked racially motivated secession attempts that were under-
taken in response to court-enforced school desegregation efforts.
23
More recently, the federal judiciary has reiterated its willingness to
strike down a secession bid even if a facially neutral reason is given for
the secession: "the doors to Federal court will be wide open should the
political process ultimately work an unconstitutionally discriminatory
result."'2  The self-determination of local government can go no fur-
(1982) (Powell, J., dissenting) (noting that annexation that abridges the fundamental
right to vote is only permitted if the municipal voting scheme is realigned to counter-
act such voter dilution); City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 370-71
(1975) (stating that a municipality created by annexation must "fairly reflect[] the
[voting] strength of the [minority] community").
121 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) ("[T]he right of suffrage can be
denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively
as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.").
V See, e.g., City of Petersburg v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1021, 1031 (D.D.C.
1972), aff'd mem., 410 U.S. 962 (1973) ("[Annexations are] approved only on the con-
dition that modifications [in the electoral plan] calculated to neutralize to the extent
possible any adverse effect upon the political participation of black voters are adopted
.... "); City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 370 (1975) (expressly reaf-
firming City of Petersburg).
1 See, e.g., United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972);
Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 460 (1972) ("If the proposal [to create a
new district] would impede the dismantling of the dual system, then a district court, in
the exercise of its remedial discretion, may enjoin it from being carried out."); Burle-
son v. County Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 308 F. Supp. 352, 357 (E.D. Ark. 1970) (noting
that there may be times where secession from a school district raises no constitutional
objection if "one or more parts will not have a substantial Negro population and thus
will have no integration problem"), affd mem, 432 F.2d 1356 (8th Cir. 1970) (per cu-
iam).
324 Jones v. Deutsch, 715 F. Supp. 1237, 1240 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). In Jones the munici-
pality denied a secession petition because boundary lines were drawn in a racially dis-
criminatory manner. Although the federal court did not reach the merits due to pro-
cedural defects, it issued an open invitation to adjudicate if the procedural defects
were cured.
This "open door" policy is not limited to cases involving constitutional violations.
The disparate impact analysis of Title VII litigation was employed by a federal court in
a Fair Housing Act case to strike down a zoning regulation prohibiting the construc-
tion of subsidized housing in a white neighborhood. See Huntington Branch NAACP
v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 934 (2d Cir. 1988) ("[T]he disparate impact ap-
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ther than that of the individual.
C. Local Governments and Voting Rights
The law also limits local government self-determination in the con-
text of disproportionate voting schemes. A local jurisdiction has no
"right" to function as a voting district. The existence of a local bound-
ary will be disregarded if recognition will result in dilution of voting
power.'2 Furthermore, the Equal Protection Clause requires popula-
tion equality between voting districts even in local government elec-
tions. 126 If population deviation between districts is too high then
"historic respect for the integrity of [local] boundaries" falls.'
27
While noting that valid considerations may underlie the "desire to
maintain the integrity of various political subdivisions" (such as mu-
county boundaries), 2 8 the Supreme Court has held that po-nicipal and  nais  rm Cuthshl tp
litical subdivisions of the state are not sovereign entities.' Therefore,
the overriding objective in state legislative apportionment "must be
substantial equality of population among the various districts, so that
the vote of any citizen is approximately equal in weight to that of any
other citizen.' 30  While "[m]athematical exactness or precision is
hardly a workable constitutional requirement,"' 31 "deviations from
population equality must be justified by legitimate state considera-
proach of Title VII cases is fully applicable to this Title VII case brought against a pub-
lic defendant."), aff'a 488 U.S. 15 (1988) (per curiam).
Title VII's scope is, by definition, statutory and, thus, perhaps not as illustrative as
constitutional limitations on the power of local government. Cases such as Huntington,
however, show a clear direction of the judiciary to hold local government responsible
for discriminatory actions just as it would an individual.
"3 See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
126 See Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 185 (1971) ("It is well established that elec-
toral apportionment must be based on the general principle of population equality
and that this principle applies to state and local elections."); Avery v. Midland County,
390 U.S. 474, 481 (1968) ("We therefore see little difference, in terms of the applica-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause ... between the exercise of state power through
legislatures and its exercise by elected officials in the cities, towns, and counties.").
127 Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 416 (1977) (holding that a deviation of 16.5%
frompopulation equality was unacceptable).
- Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 578 (1964); see also Abate, 403 U.S. at 185
("(Our statements have reflected the view that the particular circumstances and
needs of a local community as a whole may sometimes justify departures from strict
equality.").
See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 575.
1'0 Id. at 579.
131 Id. at 577.
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tions."s' Hence, local government boundaries can dissolve in the face
of a constitutional challenge.
3 3
As discussed above, the creation of a fractured system of local gov-
ernment allows citizens an extension of self. This confluence of the in-
dividual with the community likewise empowers local government the
legal position of these governments is grounded in the legal position of
the individual. If we juxtapose these seemingly inconsistent sources of
local government power, we find at the core one central theory. The
true legal power of local government (unlike state and federal govern-
ment) is premised upon the notion that its citizens form one collective
individual. If the law treats local government as a "collective individ-
ual," is it any surprise that consumers search for that collective individ-
ual who looks, thinks and acts as they do? The collective individual not
only composes the economic, political and social bases of local gov-
ernment power, but also creates its legal power.
III. THE COLLECTIVE INDIVIDUAL AND MORAL HYPERNORMS
I do not want Negroes in the City of Parma.
-Kenneth Kuczma, President of the Parma City Council in 1971
132 Abate, 403 U.S. at 185; see also Board of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 701-03
(1989) (striking down NewYork City Board of Estimate apportionment scheme of one
borough, one vote). But see Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 847-48 (1983)
(upholding an admittedly disproportionate county-based apportionment scheme due
to Wyoming's constitutional policy of preserving county boundaries and the absence
of any hint of arbitrariness or discrimination).
At-large voting systems are also subject to attack if a racially discriminatory purpose
is proven. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 621-22 (1982) (holding that at-large vot-
ing systems must be upheld against constitutional attack unless they are maintained
for a discriminatory purpose); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66-67 (1980)
(same).
153 Contrast this with the constitutionally created power of state boundaries in fed-
eral voting. States with disparate populations retain their ability to vote as a state. See
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3. Not only is this established in the creation of the United States
Senate (two senators per state, regardless of population), but is also evident in na-
tional election law. The Electoral College, which elects the President, gives three votes
to the state of Wyoming, which had 480,000 inhabitants in 1995. Montana also gets
three votes with almost twice as many residents (870,000). See U.S. DEP'T COMMERCE,
STATISTICALABSTRACT OF THE U.S. tbls. 27, 434 (1996).
'3 Government's Exhibit 118, United States v. City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1049,
1065 (N.D. Ohio 1980), aff d, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981) (holding that Parma, by re-
jecting low-income housing and enacting ordinances precluding construction of low-
income housing, violated the Fair Housing Act). Parma is Cleveland's largest suburb.
In the 1970s Parma had a reputation as a white, ethnic, suburban enclave. In 1973 the
U.S.Justice Department sued the City of Parma, alleging that the city had violated the
Fair Housing Act. President Kuczma's remarks were made during a meeting in which
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Having made the case for recasting local government to collections
of individuals, I am uneasy about the whole proposition. Is it sound to
permit unfettered "balkanization" of local government to go unchecked
by any moral limitations? Taken to its logical end, the elevation of indi-
vidual preference to the point of political and legal power would permit
unchecked discrimination on any basis, with the justification that it was
the collective will of the new community. Clearly there must be some
limit on the individual/collective will. The difficulty in formulating this
limitation is that the homogeneity prevalent in local government limits
dissent and the ensuing discourse that would otherwise challenge
moral decisions.'35 How, then, do we externally impose moral limita-
tions while maintaining internal freedom of will? The solution to this
dilemma calls for a balancing act. On one side of the scale is the neces-
sity to uphold certain normative limitations imposed by society outside
of the community. On the other side is the necessity for a community
to exclude in order to achieve the goal of "local government."
A. The Legal Ability to Exclude
Exclusion is the antithesis of the popular notion of the principles
for which our country stands. Exclusion, however, defines who we are.
Whether such exclusion is on a national level, as in immigration limita-
tions,' 3" or on a local level, as in segregated residential patterns, '13 we
a proposed subsidized housing project was rejected. This rejection formed part of the
Justice Department's case against Parma. The district court imposed a remedial order
designed to promote residential racial integration in Parma. See United States v. City
of Parma, 504 F. Supp. 913, 918-23 (N.D. Ohio 1980), affd in part, rev'd in pat, 661
F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981) (enjoining the City of Parma from actions that violate the Fair
Housing Act and ordering the city to implement fair housing education programs, to
enact a fair housing resolution, to advertise Parma as an open community, and to take
actions to increase the supply of low-income housing). The mayor and leaders of city
council resisted the remedial order, delaying its implementation until 1983. Although
some progress has been made (the 1990 census showed a black population of 0.75% as
compared to 0.04% in 1970), seeW. DENNIS KEATING, THE SUBURBAN RAcIAL DILEMMA
3 (1994), such progress has been slow and Parma's image as a racist community re-
mains. For further discussion of Parma and other situations facing African Americans
in the suburbs, see id. (addressing "housing segregation and efforts at housing inte-
gration in the suburbs of metropolitan areas").
135 As Professor Ford notes, "individualism comes with a covert normative struc-
ture... [that] makes it difficult to understand the political claims of minority, racial
and cultural groups as anything other than strategic, distributive, remedial or separa-
tist." Ford, supra note 3, at 1892 n.149.
136 For example, The Quota Act of 1921, ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5, and the Immigration Act
of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153, limited immigrant admission contingent upon the na-
tional origin of the immigrant. Under these acts the number of immigrants from any
one nation was limited to 3% of the number of foreign-born persons of such national-
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cannot close our eyes to the existence of legally sanctioned exclusion.
Such exclusion, though, should not be viewed as democratic deficiency,
but rather as "a necessary consequence of a community's process of self-
definition. " s
An all-inclusive community is oxymoronic's' Such an all-inclusive
community would be a community without parameters, boundaries or
definition. It would not be a community. Community is based on
commonality, and commonality is the antonym of difference. Exclu-
sion, for all of its negative connotations to our liberal-thinking minds, is
necessary for the creation of self. After all, we are not only defined by
what we are but also by what we are not. The difficulty in addressing
exclusion based on difference is that ascribing difference is not a value-
neutral exercise. As Professor Minow points out: "The attribution of
difference hides the power of those who classify and of the institutional
arrangements that enshrine one type of person as the norm, and then
treat classifications of difference as inherent and natural while debasing
those defined as different."
1 40
ity resident in the United States as determined by the Census of 1910. See Andrew
Smith, The Rough Road for Vietnamese Visa Applicants in Hong Kong, 21 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 649, 656 & n.74 (1996) (providing a background for United States immigra-
tion legislation); see also Frank H. Wu, The Limits of Borders: A Moderate Proposal for Im-
migration Reform, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV., Summer 1996, at 35, 42 (discussing how
prior to 1965 immigration by Eastern and Southern Europeans was limited by strict
quotas, especially if their countries of origin were more heavily Catholic orJewish).
African Americans in the United States experience "hypersegregation" to a
greater degree than any other minority group, especially when analyzing neighbor-
hood dissimilarity (ethnic concentration) and spatial isolation (clustering of racially
concentrated neighborhoods). See Douglas S. Massey & Nancy A. Denton, Hypersegre-
gation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas: Black and Hispanic Segregation Along Five Dimensions,
DEMOGRAPHY, Aug. 1989, at 373, 389 ("Blacks are thus unique in experiencing multi-
dimensional hypersegregation."). See generally THE HOUSING STATUS OF BLACK
AMERICANS (Wilhelmina Leigh & James Stewart eds., 1992) (exploring the limited
housing opportunities available to blacks caused by continued racial discrimination
and economic and policy changes). Furthermore, African Americans experience sub-
urban segregation at higher levels than any other U.S. minority group. See Thomas J.
Phelan & Mark Schneider, Race, Ethnicity, and Class in American Suburbs, 31 URB. AFF.
REV. 659, 675 (1996) ("Despite substantial changes over time in the ethnic composi-
tion of migrants to suburbs, blacks are still the most highly underrepresented ethnic
groug of the 'big three' minority ethnic groups in the United States.").
Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439 (1982) (holding that strict scrutiny is
inappropriate where the restriction against aliens "primarily serves a political func-
tion").
S39 "A 'difference community' is an oxymoron." James W. Torke, Wat Price Belong-
ing: An Essay on Groups, Community, and the Constitution, 24 IND. L. REV. 1, 33 (1990)
(defining a "difference community" as a community that emphasizes differing views
and beliefs as opposed to sameness).W MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND
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The goal, then, is to identify universal norms for regulating exclu-
sion based on difference. Such "hypemorms""' would override the will
of the collective community. Such universally imposed norms are ne-
cessitated, not only by obligations of societal morality, but also by every
day reality. As communities are in close proximity, if not contiguous
with each other, there will undoubtedly be substantial intercommunity
relationships. If for no other reason than efficiency,43 overriding
norms that apply regardless of geographic location must be estab-
lished.144 Think of the region expressed as a series of concentric circles
with an individual in the center and the entire region as the outermost
ring. As we move out along the radius, we can expect to find less and
less consensus as to norms because consensus falls as there is more di-
versity of opinion. However, strong norms will emerge; these are our
hypernorms. The discovery of these hypernorms will enable us to de-
termine, hypothetically, when and on what basis exclusion for differ-
ence is permitted and when it is prohibited. In essence the hypemorm
will establish the line between decisions that are private and beyond the
scope of governmental intervention and those that are not.
45
AMERICAN LAW 111 (1990).
141 See Thomas Donaldson & Thomas W. Dunfee, Toward a Unified Conception of
Business Ethics: Integrative Social Contracts Theory, 19 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 252, 265 (1994)
("Hypernorms... entail principles so fundamental to human existence that they serve
as a guide in evaluating lower level moral norms. As such, we would expect them to be
reflected in a convergence of religious, philosophical and cultural beliefs .... ").
To explain how hypernorms will overrule even the unanimous consent of par-
ties to microsocial contracts, Dunfee and Donaldson use the example that contractors
would not permit microsocial contracts that condone murder as a method of enforc-
ing contracts even under conditions of unanimous consent because a rule against
murder is included in a set of standards to which all societies can be held. See id. at
265.
4For example, enforcement of racially restrictive covenants in one community
but not another would result in real estate agents and apartment managers analyzing
the family tree of all prospective buyers and renters, thereby resulting in additional
transaction costs.
144 The logical question at this point is whether these norms should merely be
suggestions, with the market determining compliance, or whether these norms should
have the force of law and be actionable. This same discussion is played out today in
discussions on affirmative action. The difficulty in relying on the market model to as-
sure compliance is that discrimination (i.e., exclusion) is sometimes perfectly rational
and the market will not punish a rational actor. The interventionist model, which le-
gally punishes noncompliance, is the only way to assure the even application of hyper-
norms across community lines. For a discussion of the interventionist model versus
the market model to eradicate housing discrimination and segregation, see Alex M.
Johnson, Jr., How Race and Poverty Intersect to Prevent Integration: Destabilizing Race as a
Vehicle to Integrate Neighborhoods, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1595, 1616 (1995).
145 There is a consensus amongst anthropologists, political scientists and philoso-
phers that there exists such a convergence of beliefs across cultures that identifies hyper-
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B. Limitations on the Ability to Exclude
This country has had a long history of racial discrimination.14 As a
society though, we have moved (albeit in fits and starts) away from the
institutionalized racism of slavery, through state imposed racism of the
Jim Crow era, through tolerance of racism in spheres not implicating
fundamental rights, and finally, to attempts at erasing racism altogether
through programs such as affirmative action and preferential treat-
ment. By analyzing the role of the law in housing discrimination, a
small aspect of the multifaceted problem of racial discrimination, we
can begin to devise when individual decisions to discriminate must suc-
cumb to externally imposed norms of multicultural inclusion. Housing
discrimination cases are well suited to this endeavor because of the
courts' willingness to impose state values on private decisions.'
1. Necessity of State Action
Beginning with Buchanan v. Warley,48 the Supreme Court has re-
fused to allow the state to be an active participant in private housing
discrimination. In Buchanan, the Court struck down a city provision
norms. SeeDonaldson & Dunfee, supra note 141, at 265-66.
146 I speak here not solely of de jure discrimination resulting in racial segregation,
discussed infra, but also of defacto racial segregation that still persists today. See gener-
ally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION
AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 84 (1993) ("Although the racial climate of the
United States improved outwardly during the 1970s, racism still restricted the residen-
tial freedom of black Americans; itjust did so in less blatant ways."); Douglas S. Massey
& Nancy A. Denton, Patterns of Neighborhood Transition in a Multiethnic World: U.S. Met-
ropolitan Areas, 1970-1980, 28 DEMOGRAPHY 41 (1991) (concluding that "white popula-
tion loss is related strongly to both the proportion of minority members and the dis-
tance to established minority neighborhoods; this relationship builds a self-feeding
dynamic into the process of ghetto expansion"); Massey & Denton, Hypersegregation,
supra note 137, at 388 (confirming previous studies documenting a persistently high
degree of black residential segregation and suggesting that this segregation is "even
more extreme than previously imagined"); see also Richard H. Sander, Comment, In-
dividual Rights and Demographic Realities: The Problem of Fair Housing, 82 NW. U. L. REV.
874, 874-76 (1988) (exploring why fair housing laws have failed to bring about housing
integration).
A discussion of how the public/private dichotomy factors into the Court's will-
ingness to intervene is not novel. See, e.g., Barbara Rook Snyder, Private Motivation,
State Action and the Allocation of Responsibility for Fourteenth Amendment Violations, 75
CORNELL L. REV. 1053, 1053 n.1 (1990) (providing a partial list of scholarship con-
cerning the state action requirement). What I hope to accomplish here is to present a
brief analysis of the changing and evolving scope of this distinction that will highlight
the power of societal interest over private agreements.
PIS 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
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that permitted discrimination on the basis of race in the sale or lease of
houses." Relying on its decision in Buchanan, the Court ten years later,
had no difficulty declaring a racially discriminatory town ordinance in-
valid in the 1927 case of Harmon v. Tyler.'50 Yet, just one year earlier, in
1926, the Court was unwilling to strike down a racially restrictive cove-
nant in Corigan v. BuckleyP because the restrictive covenant at issue was
a private contract with no state involvement. The Court dismissed the
action for lack of jurisdiction because, inter alia, it found no constitu-
tional prohibition on "private individuals.., entering into contracts re-
specting the control and disposition of their own property.
15 2
In 1948, in Hurd v. Hodge151 and Shelley v. Kraemer,T the issue at
hand was once again a private agreement-a restrictive covenant. The
restrictive covenant ran with the land and prohibited sale of the prop-
erty to non-Caucasians. The petitioners sought an injunction to en-
force the covenant.
The imposition of state action was not nearly as direct in these cases
as it had been in Buchanan. Instead of the state promulgating a racial
restriction, as was the case in Buchanan, in these cases the argument was
that the state was using its power to enforce a privately imposed racial
restriction. However, despite the less direct state action, in each case
the court found this state action of enforcement unconstitutional.
5
The court carefully avoided declaring the covenants invalid.'96 In both
149 The Court explained:
We think this attempt to prevent the alienation of the property in question
to a person of color was not a legitimate exercise of the police power of the
State, and is in direct violation of the fundamental law enacted in the Four-
teenth Amendment of the Constitution preventing state interference with
property rights except by due process of law.
Id. at 82.
150 273 U.S. 668 (1927) (per curiam). Ordinance No. 8037, C. C. S., adopted by
the City of New Orleans on September 18, 1924, forbade African Americans from oc-
cupying houses in a white community or whites from occupying houses in African
American communities except upon written consent of a majority of persons of
opposite" race in the community affected.
, 271 U.S. 323 (1926).
152 Id. at 330.
15 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
154 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
155 See id. at 20; Hurd, 334 U.S. at 35.
156 So long as the purposes of those agreements are effectuated by voluntary ad-
herence to their terms, it would appear clear that there has been no action by the
State and the provisions of the [Fourteenth] Amendment have not been violated."
Shelley, 334 U.S. at 13.
Nothing in the opinion of this Court... may properly be regarded as an ad-
judication of the issue presented by petitioners in this case which concerns,
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Hurd and Shelley, the Court was determining the validity of the enforce-
ment of the covenants, not the validity of the covenants themselves.
We see the beginning of the discovery of our hypernorm: at the
threshold, discriminatory private agreements are subject to state intervention if
there is state action involved to enforce such agreements.
2. Abandoning the State Action Requirement
Building on Shelley, the Court in Barrows v. Jackson, 57 again invali-
dated the enforcement of a private covenant based on state action. Un-
like Shelley, the state in Barrows was not asked to "enforce" a racially re-
strictive covenant through the court's equity powers. Rather, the
question presented was whether there was state action in the awarding
of damages in a civil suit for breach of contract for violating the restric-
tive covenant. The Court shifted away from reliance on direct state ac-
tion and held that "[i]f the State may thus punish respondent for her
failure to carry out her covenant, she is coerced to continue to use her
property in a discriminatory manner .... [Such punishment] would
constitute state action as surely as it was state action to enforce such
,,1511covenants in equity ....
ChiefJustice Vinson, who wrote the Court's decisions in Shelley and
Hurd, dissented and sought to limit the voiding of such covenants to in-
not the validity of the restrictive agreements standing alone, but the validity of
court enforcement of the restrictive covenants under the [D]ue [P]rocess
[C]lause of the Fifth Amendment.
Hurd, 334 U.S. at 28-29.
W 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
138 Id. at 254 (citing Shelley, 334 U.S. 1). The Court in this case also broadened the
status of potential litigants in housing discrimination cases. Eschewing the threshold
requirement that the party show that he or she is in the class whose constitutional
rights are allegedly infringed (the petitioner here being a home seller, not a prospec-
tive minority purchaser), the Court stated:
[W]e are faced with a unique situation in which it is the action of the state
court which might result in a denial of constitutional rights and in which it
would be difficult if not impossible for the persons whose rights are asserted
to present their grievance before any court. Under the peculiar circum-
stances of this case, we believe the reasons which underlie our rule denying
standing to raise another's rights.., are outweighed by the need to protect
the fundamental rights which would be denied by permitting the damages ac-
tion to be maintained.
Barrows, 346 U.S. at 257. This dilution of the standing requirement may be inter-
preted to indicate the Court's willingness, at times, to use extraordinary means to ad-
dress and manipulate private agreements that contravene the public goal of the eradi-
cation of housing discrimination.
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stances where there was direct state action against a member of a pro-
tected class. Pertinent to our discussion of state intervention in private
agreements, the ChiefJustice wrote:
[T]hese racial restrictive covenants... are not legal nullities so far as
any doctrine of federal law is concerned; it is not unlawful to make
them; it is not unlawful to enforce them unless the method by which
they are enforced in some way contravenes the Federal Constitution or a
federal statute.159
A brief pause here at the crossroads of Barrows allows us to mull
over the liniitations of state regulation of private agreement. The Court
has unanimously struck down instances where the state perpetuates
(Buchanan, Harmon) or facilitates (Hurd, Shelley) racial discrimination.
Historically, though, the Court has shied away from striking down
"purely private" contracts (Corrigan). By recognizing that a more dif-
fuse standard, the murky notion of "coercion," violates the rights of un-
specified third parties-moving away from the bright line rule of state
enforcement-the Court has signaled its willingness to sacrifice the pri-
vate agreement for the public good.
The Court, however, is still struggling with the notion brought forth
in the Civil Rights Cases:' Action prohibited by the Fourteenth
Amendment "is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the
States. That Amendment erects no shield against merely private con-
duct, however discriminatory or wrongful."'' Yet the Court finds hous-
ing discrimination so repugnant that in this "unique set of circum-
stances" 62 it has begun to relax both procedural (standing questions)
and substantive (state action) requirements.
We can begin to tease out our hypernorm: private action that results
in racial/ethnic discrimination presents such a "unique" situation that it cannot
be aided by the state even if there is no direct state involvement. While it may
not be unlawful to be a bigot, the state will not assist you in such en-
deavors. What is undecided is the scope of the definition of "aid." The
Court is moving away, notwithstanding dissent, from the idea that "aid"
is confined to state action, as characterized by active enforcement, and
moving towards the notion that "aid" includes any state involvement.
Running parallel with the Court's exploration of the evolving con-
159 Barrows, 346 U.S. at 261 (Vinson, CJ., dissenting).
160 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
161 Shelley, 334 U.S. at 13.
162 Barrows, 346 U.S. at 259. "The Court, by a unique species of arguments, has de-
veloped a unique exception to an otherwise easily understood doctrine." Id. at 260-61
(Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
[Vol. 145:607
DECONSTRUCTING THE LEGAL C=TY
stitutional role of the state in regard to private, discriminatory con-
tracts, are the legislative initiatives that reflect a growing public dissatis-
faction with racially restrictive covenants. Passed as a part of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 provides that the purchase, sale or
leasing of real and personal property is afforded to all citizens of the
United States without regard to color.'6a This law was originally held to
apply only to state action."4 However, in 1968, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co.'O the Supreme Court took the "state action" requirement out of the
equation. The Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals,
which had held that § 1982 only applied to state action and thus did not
reach private refusals to sell real property based on race. Therefore, af-
ter Jones, intervention is no longer relegated to the shadows. The Court
embraced state intervention in private agreements even in the absence
of state action. '"e hold that § 1982 bars all racial discrimination, pri-
vate as well as public, in the sale or rental of property, and that the stat-
ute, thus construed, is a valid exercise of the power of Congress to en-
force the Thirteenth Amendment."''
It is worth noting that the Court's decision in Jones is not predicated
on the Fair Housing Title (Title VIII) of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.67
Title VIII is full of proscriptions,' prescriptionsIta causes of action 70
and remedies. 7 ' By contrast, § 1982 is a single flat pronouncement that
requires the courts, through judicial interpretation, to find the level at
which a citizen's rights to real property have been abridged on account
of race. The Court's explicit reliance on § 1982 provides us with an
even stronger normative compass than reliance upon Title VIII would
16" "All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold,
and convey real and personal property." 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1996).
164 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 379 F.2d 33, 44-45 (8th Cir. 1967). Hurd v.
Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 34 (1948), was also decided upon analysis of§ 1982, but there the
Court found sufficient state action to apply the statute.
165 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
166 Id. at 413.
167 Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3601
(1996)) (making discrimination in housing rentals and sales illegal);Jones, 392 U.S. at
413.
10 § 804 (a)-(e), 82 Stat. at 83 (prohibiting discrimination in the sale or rental of
housing).
§ 808 (e), 82 Stat. at 85 (describing the duties of the Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development).
70 §§ 810-813, 82 Stat. at 85-88 (listing causes of action that trigger Title VIII).
171 § 812, 82 Stat. at 88 (granting remedies for Title VIII violations in federal
court.).
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have.'7 The wide latitude of discretion afforded the Court in actions
based upon § 1982 allows the Court to fashion its decision not upon
statutory limitations but rather upon prevailing societal norms.
One year later in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.," 3 the Court re-
visited the application of § 1982 to private contracts and expanded its
holding in Jones. In Sullivan, an African-American resident was denied
membership to a community pool and park, although he held a mem-
bership share.'74 The issue before the Court was whether the refusal to
grant membership to African Americans solely on the basis of race de-
nied them property rights in violation of § 1982. Based upon its deci-
sion in Jones, the Court held that § 1982 was applicable to private
agreements and that the membership share in the park was property as
covered by § 1982.7-5
Justice Harlan dissented again in Sullivan, objecting once again to
the crossing of the public/private line of demarcation. 17  There was
another disagreement; Harlan raised the question of why the Court was
deciding this case when the Fair Housing Act would have been better
suited to the task.177 Harlan cautioned against the use of § 1982 to
172 The Court's expansion of the applicability of § 1982, however, was not unani-
mous. Justice Harlan's dissent in Jones reiterates the same concerns raised by Chief
Justice Vinson in Barrows. Justice Harlan argued, "the Court's construction of § 1982
as applying to purely private action is almost surely wrong, and at the least is open to
serious doubt." Jones, 392 U.S. at 450 (Harlan,J., dissenting).
173 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
7' See id. at 234-35. The African-American resident who was denied use of the fa-
cilities had been assigned a membership share in connection with his lease of a house
in the area. According to the bylaws of Little Hunting Park, Inc.-the nonstock cor-
poration organized to operate the community's recreational facilities-a person who
rented his home and who owned a membership share was entitled to assign that
membership share to the tenant. A membership share entitled its holder to use the
community recreational facilities. Id.
175 See id. at 236 ("What we have here is a device functionally comparable to a racially
restrictive covenant, the judicial enforcement of which was struck down in Shelley v. Krae-
176 See id. at 247, 248 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Today the Court goes yet beyond
Jones.... ."). Justice Harlan's public/private distinction, however, does have its limits.
In his concurrence in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcot-
ics, he noted that "injuries inflicted by officials acting under color of law.., are sub-
stantially different in kind [from those inflicted by private parties]." Bivens v. Six Un-
known Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 409 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring) (asserting that statutory authority is not necessarily a prereq-
uisite to constitutional enforcement in damage suits).
177 See Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 241-42 (Harlan,J., dissenting). Justice Harlan argued:
Because the Fair Housing Law will become fully effective less than three
weeks from now, I think the majority even more unwise than it was in Jones, in
precipitately breathing still more life into § 1982, which is both vague and
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combat racial discrimination in housing because "lurking in the back-
ground are grave constitutional issues should § 1982 be extended too
far into some types of private discrimination. [Section] 1982 fail[s] to
provide standards as to the types of transactions in which discrimination
is unlawful ....,,178
The essence of the public/private distinction crystallizes. Why
would the Court stretch to reformulate private transactions based on
§ 1982 when a cause of action in the Fair Housing Act was waiting in
the wings? The exigency and importance of civil rights and the eradica-
tion of housing discrimination based on race was such a normative im-
perative that it required extraordinary measures.179 Our hypernorm can
be refined: racial and ethnic discrimination will not be tolerated by the gov-
ernment. Moreover, the government is empowered to void purely private transac-
tions that contravene this goaL'.
open-ended, when Congress has provided this modem statute, containing de-
tailed remedial provisions aimed at eliminating racial discrimination in hous-
ing.
Id. (footnote omitted).
178 Id. at 248 (citing The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)); see also supra note
172 and accompanying text.
179 See Frances Lee Ansley, Stirring the Ashes: Race, Class and the Future of Civil Rights
Scholarship, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 993, 1031 n.155 ("[Clivil rights cases and statutes
eventually made significant inroads on formal boundaries of 'public' and 'private'
spheres."). One only need look at the headlines of the times to grasp the urgency of
such imperatives. Racial strife in this country was rampant when Jones and Sullivan
were decided. In this analysis we "must be mindful of the 'events and passions of the
time'...." General Bldg. Contractors v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 386 (1982)
(quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 803 (1966)).
ISO Some may argue that the Court in Sullivan, by rejecting the trial court's conclu-
sion that Little Hunting Park was a "private social club," Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 236
("There was no plan or purpose of exclusiveness. It is open to every white person
within the geographic area, there being no selective element other than race."), went
beyond the property scope of § 1982 by tying pool membership to a leasehold. "By
attempting to deal with the problem of discrimination in the provision of recreational
facilities under § 1982, the Court is forced, in the context of a very vague statute, to
decide what transactions involve 'property' for the purposes of § 1982." Id. at 248
(Harlan,J., dissenting).
The Court's willingness to make this leap illustrates the normative power of the
desire to eradicate racial discrimination in all sectors. The Court further expanded its
definition of "property" in Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431
(1973). In this case, the property link to recreational facilities was even more tenuous
(residence simply enhanced one's ability to join the club, it did not confer automatic
membership). Nonetheless, the Court concluded that since membership in a racially
exclusive club enhanced property values of those allowed to join the club, the racially
restrictive code of the pool was in violation of, inter alia, § 1982. See id. at 437.
A similar expansion of state oversight of private contracts occurred outside of the
real estate context in the Court's interpretation of§ 1981. In 1976 the Court held that
§ 1981 "prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of private con-
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Stated as such, the hypernorm challenges the primacy of the private
sphere where "people [a]re free to act in a self-interested manner,
without regard to the interests, needs or expectations of others. 18 In
essence, it challenges our individualism. The imposition of this hyper-
norm-a universal normative value-seems to require a sacrifice of self
to the community.
Left unchecked this hypernorm is like a runaway engine roaring
towards the destruction of our individually based communities. How
can we exalt individualism and at the same time bow to norms that sub-
ordinate the individual to the greater society? Clearly there must be
limitations on the hypernorm.
3. Limits of State Intervention
In 1981, in City of Memphis v. Greene, s 2 the Supreme Court applied
the brakes to private actions based on § 1982. While conceding that
private action is subject to review under § 1982, the Court required a
showing of racial motivation to establish a prima facie case.'8 In Greene,
a white neighborhood sought to close a street-an action that would
have denied access to people living in the adjacent neighborhood
(who, notably, were primarily African-American). The Court found
that there was "no evidence that the closing was motivated by any ra-
cially exclusionary desire."184 Rather, in language reminiscent of Belle
Terre,"" the Court wrote that "[t]he city's decision to close West Drive
was motivated by its interest in protecting the safety and tranquillity of a
residential neighborhood."
86
Justice Marshall, writing for the dissent, voiced no disagreement
with the requirement of a showing of discriminatory intent. Rather, he
focused on the presence of unspoken racial motivation.' 87 Whether ornot there was a sufficient showing of racial motivation in Greene is irrele-
tracts." Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168 (1976). This decision was revisited and
reaffirmed in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
181 Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALL. REV. 465, 481 (1988) (book
review).
182 451 U.S. 100 (1981).
183 See id. at 119-20.
184 Id. at 114.
185 Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (describing Belle Terre as
"[a] quiet place where yards are wide, people few and motor vehicles restricted" and
noting that these are "legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family
needs").
186 Greene, 451 U.S. at 119.
187 Id. at 141-55.
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vant to the present discussion, for we have found the boundary of the
hypemorm: conduct that may have discriminatory impact is permissible if
there is no discriminatory motive. This is not a radical thought. Zoning
laws that promote economic segregation likewise promote racial segre-
gation'8 and, for the most part, legal attempts to manipulate zoning
laws to eradicate this segregation have had only limited success. 9 I
submit that this lack of success is due to the fact that the motive of the
segregation is economic, and economic segregation does not challenge
American society's value structure as does racial segregation. Without
racial motivation our societal hypernorm is not violated.
Application of this hypernorm will attempt to shape collective be-
havior beyond individual will. This notion conjures up the image of a
salmon (manipulation of collective behavior) swimming upstream
against the current (power of individual rights). The difficulty is that
the hypernorm attempts to ban segregation (group dynamic) while still
allowing prejudice (individual choice). Separating segregation from
prejudice is difficult because there is no way to clearly disaggregate
"voluntary" segregation (a result of prejudice) from "involuntary" seg-
regation (a result of market forces)."O'
The function of the hypernorm is not to destroy individual choice.
Rather, it serves to stake out the boundaries of individual choice as that
choice "transforms" into collective behavior.'9 ' Housing discrimination
I 188 It is commonly assumed that economic segregation contributes to racial segre-
gation because the African-American poverty rate is higher than the white poverty
rate. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS, CONSUMER INCOME, SERIES P60-188, INCOME, POVERTY, AND VALUATION OF
NONCASH BENEFITS: 1993, at xvi tbl.C (1995) (stating that in the United States in
1993, 9.9% of whites (not of Hispanic origin) lived in poverty, while 33.1% of the
black population lived in poverty). But see Sander, supra note 146, at 886 ("[M]iddle
class blacks experience virtually the same level of segregation as the black community
as a whole."); see also Phelan & Schneider, supra note 137.
189 See e.g., cases cited supra note 7 (requiring zoning regulations to allow for the
development of low and moderate income housing); Britton v. Town of Chester, 595
A.2d 492 (N.H. 1991) (striking down as exclusionary a zoning ordinance which,
through density limitations, excluded persons of low or moderate income).
190 Richard Sander contends that such a distinction cannot be maintained and
that discrimination and segregation cannot be addressed in isolation. "[N]either dis-
crimination nor segregation can be addressed in isolation from one another. Even if
most discrimination is eliminated, the residual can trigger the cycle of resegregation
and leave the ghetto intact." Sander, supra note 146, at 903. I assert that we must try.
Although the hypernorm can, and should, shape collective behavior, it cannot eradi-
cate individual will.
191 Transformation of individual choice into collective behavior is premised upon
the theory that "[i]ndividual choice is a microcosmic facet of collective or social
choice." WARRENJ. SAMUELS, 1 ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 58
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cannot and should not be tolerated, let alone aided, by the govern-
ment. For societal good, the individual choice of racial prejudice must
be sacrificed insofar as it becomes the collective behavior of housing
discrimination. However, since sacrifice of individual choice is prem-
ised upon racial prejudice, we should be willing to allow choices not
based upon racial/ethnic prejudice to remain. '9'
IV. THE STRUGGLE TO RESTRUCTURE LOcAL GOVERNMENT
"Is it larger than a breadbox?"
-Twenty Questions
We are trying to fit the round peg of collective individuality into the
square hole of the present state of local government law. To a certain
extent, the law does recognize local government as a collective individ-
ual, free to determine its fate without intervention from those outside
the community.193 But local government falls short of allowing com-
plete freedom on two somewhat contradictory fronts. First, while the
law does, in some instances, validate the revealed choice of those choos-
ing to move to the suburbs by treating suburbs and city separately in-
stead of regionally,94 it penalizes others for an individual's choice by
not forcing upon the migrator an internalization of the externalities
produced by such migration. Second, the law, through secession stat-
(1992).
192 There is of course, the legal quagmire that surfaces in any discrimination case:
Is it enough to prove discriminatory impact or must actual discriminatory motive be
proven? See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (holding that when an
employer's facially neutral rule is shown to have a racially disproportionate effect on
job applicants, that rule will violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 unless it is
shown to be related to job performance). Lowering the bar to allow impact alone may
permit many types of "discrimination" (e.g., economic) to eviscerate individual choice
so that the individual will disappear from the equation. However, as the dissent in City
of Memphis maintained, racial and ethnic discrimination, more often than not, is not
blatant, and disparate impact may be the only evidence. See City of Memphis, 451 U.S. at
151-53 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
193 For example, courts frequently uphold the validity of zoning codes. See Village
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding a zoning regulation in
spite of land owners' protests that the regulation reduced property values). But see
Mount Laurel and progeny, supra note 7 (striking down narrow zoning laws and hold-
ing that a municipality's land use regulations must provide a realistic opportunity for
low and moderate income housing).
194This dichotomous treatment, some say, has been the downfall of past urban
strategy. See Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of the Inner City, HARV. BUS.
RFV., May-June 1995, at 55, 55 ("Lacking an overall strategy, such programs have
treated the inner city as an island isolated from the surrounding economy and subject
to its own unique laws of competition.").
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utes, limits the individuality of those consumers who may want to re-
main physically, but not politically, in the city. The new local govern-
ment structure, therefore, should combine features of deurbanization
with a mechanism to internalize negative externalities while maintain-
ing faith to our societal hypernorms. In effect I am trying to build a re-
gional "mosaic culture.""' The tiles would be the collective individual
communities while the grout that holds them together insures that
negative externalities are spread evenly across the mosaic.
A. The Neighborhood as a Political Entity
What is the optimal level at which to express this collective indi-
vidualism? Obviously, as Professor Frug noted, absolute individual self
determination is "pure fantasy."'' It is just as clear that large cities lack
the homogeneity necessary to allow individualism to shine through. '9'
The legal goal is to superimpose distinguishing economic and social
characteristics on a region to give spatial life to collective individualism.
The neighborhood would be the optimal level for city government.
The idea of using the neighborhood as the optimal spatial unit is cer-
tainly not newt.s'1 Social functionalist planners organized the city
around the neighborhood unit because the neighborhood fosters
community at the local level by increasing participation in democracy
and serving to distribute scarce resources.'1 What is unique about the
15 BRIAN J.L. BERRY, THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANIZATION 66 (1973)
(defining "mosaic culture" as "a society with a number of parallel and distinctly differ-
ent life styles").
96 Frug, supra note 2, at 1069.
:97 See PARK, supra note 46, at 90 ("The difficulty of maintaining in the city the in-
timate contacts which in the small town insured the existence of a common purpose
and made concerted action possible is certainly very great.").
198 See generally HERBERTJ. GANS, THE URBAN VILLAGERS at ix (1962) (reporting a
study of a now defunct low-income Boston neighborhood); HOWARD W. HALLMAN,
NEIGHBORHOOD GOVERNMENT IN A METROPOLITAN SETTING 12 (1974) (asserting
"[n]eighborhood government should be established in the larger cities of the United
States [as it] would contribute to improved urban governance"); DAVID MORRIS &
KARL HESS, NEIGHBORHOOD POVER: THE NEW LOCALISM 5, 99 (1975) (attempting to
define the concept of "neighborhood" and noting that neighborhoods can be based
upon direct participation); William Grigsby et al., The Dynamics of Neighborhood Change
and Declin4 28 PROGRESS IN PLAN. 1, 20 (1987) ("[D]espite the long history of interest
in urban neighborhoods, consensus about precisely what they are or should be does
not exist."); Yates, supra note 37. The neighborhood continues to be a fertile area of
social research. See, e.g., Christopher Mele, Globalization, Culture and Neighborhood
Change: Reinventing the Lower East Side of New York, 32 URB. AFF. REV. 3 (1996)
(discussing changes in the "East Village" and reactions of inhabitants).
i1 For a discussion of this topic, see Keith Aoki, Race, Space and Place: The Relation-
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political neighborhood, as envisioned here, is that this neighborhood
would function politically and legally autonomously from the city, or
local government, to which it once belonged.
Furthermore, neighborhoods are also rich repositories of local val-
ues.2 00 The division of governmental powers should reflect such com-
201munity values. While hypernorms would overrule conflicting com-
munity norms, the common values within the community would form
the basis of self-definition.2
The next question is almost immediate: how do we decide what is
(and what is not) a "neighborhood?" Moreover, who gets to decide the
boundaries of these newly empowered municipalities, the new "Political
Neighborhood"? There are no generally accepted legal or economic
principles for determining a municipality's geographic dimensions or
even whether that unit should exist.20 3 This is relatively uncharted legal
ship Between Architectural Modernism, Post-Modernism, Urban Planning, and Gentification,
20 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 699, 724-27 (1993) (citing work of social functionalist planners
such as Clarence Stein in Radburn, NewJersey).
200 See GANS, supra note 55, at 14-15 (explaining that "the various ethnic groups [in
a poor Boston neighborhood] at various points... had common values").
201 See Arthur Maass, Division of Powers: An Areal Analysis, in AREA AND POWER 9, 9
(Arthur Maass ed., 1959) ("[D]ivision of powers ... is instrumental of community val-
ues; and the form of the division at any time should, and likely will, reflect the values
of that time.").
202This raises the questions of whether such variance would trigger an equal pro-
tection claim and, assuming it does, the level of scrutiny the courts would impose. Al-
though the answer to this dilemma is outside the scope of this Article, Professor Neu-
man offers the following insight:
Thus, what I am proposing is that intrastate variations in the scope of funda-
mental rights that result from the independent decisions of self-governing po-
litical subdivisions should be excused from heightened scrutiny and subjected
only to the rational basis test. They should be excused because they are justi-
fied by their contribution to the goal of local self-determination, though not
in a way that would withstand heightened scrutiny under the equal protection
clause. An exception to the scrutiny that would otherwise be applied is there-
fore required when geographical classifications affect fundamental rights.
Gerald L. Neuman, Territorial Discrimination, Equal Protection, and Self-Determination, 135
U. PA. L. REV. 261, 311-12 (1987).
205 See Who Rules at Home?, supra note 3, at 395 (stating "the concept of self-
government does not dictate who is the 'self' that does the governing"); George C.
Galster, What Is Neighbourhood? An Externalit)'-Space Approach, 10 INT'L J. URBAN &
REGIONAL RES. 243, 243-45 (1986) (stating that no consensus exists regarding the
definition of a neighborhood and arguing for a new conceptual definition); see also,
e.g., Grigsby et al., supra note 198, at 20 ("[Djespite the long history of interest in ur-
ban neighborhoods, consensus about precisely what they are or should be does not
exist."). This definitional question is not unique to creation of local governments. As
the breakup of the former Yugoslavia has shown, on the international level there is no
universally valid criteria for identifying a genuine nation.
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teritory!" The law must walk the fine line between realist concerns
(what are the physical, objective boundaries?) and instrumental con-
cerns (what should be the boundaries to achieve the goals of govern-
ment?) without falling into undue reliance on the descriptive (what do
residents think are the boundaries?).
The realist sees a neighborhood as bounded by tangible,'objective
markers: streets, rivers, etc. This argument runs parallel to the "natural
areas" argument of Park. 5 Use of objective markers, however, may
mask true collective individualism. For while objective markers may be
easy to use, they are imposed from the outside. As has been asserted by
scholars writing subsequent to Park, what makes these "natural areas"
natural exists in the mind of the researcher.2°r What would be deter-
mined by the realist definition of a neighborhood is less what the
neighborhood is than what, for bureaucratic efficiency, an outsider
thinks that it is.
An instrumental determination is, admittedly, less objective. Here
the boundaries would be drawn to reflect the underlying goal of decen-
tralization of government. How should the neighborhood achieve the
goals of decentralized government? If, for example, the Jeffersonian
ideals of suffrage and participation 20 were the goal, then the neighbor-
hood would be numerically limited by the optimal number of inhabi-
tants to produce the highest levels of political participation.
I submit however, that our goal is more subjective. To be sure, the
efficiency arguments of the realists must be given their due for this end
to be at all workable. Yet, the "should" question is as important as the
objective goals and must be dealt with in tandem. To truly express col-
There have been attempts in the economics and social science literature to de-
termine municipalities' geographic dimensions. See, e.g., Galster, supra note 203, at
246-47 (attempting to delineate neighborhoods using an "externality space" model);
Albert Hunter, The Urban Neighborhood: Its Analytical and Social Contexts, 14 URB. AFF. Q.
267, 267 (1979) (summarizing "three approaches to the study of neighborhoods: (1)
typologies, (2) stages of change, and (3) functions"). As Professor Frug points out:
"The fact that some projects might fail can no more serve as an argument against
these experiments than the fact that some projects might succeed, although both ar-
guments are commonly made when such city ventures are proposed." Frug, supra note
2, at 1151.
205 See PARK, supra note 46, at 172 ("Natural areas are the habitats of natural
groups. Every typical urban area is likely to contain a characteristic selection of the
population of the community as a whole.").
206 See WEIHER, supra note 47, at 43 ("Most subsequent research ... casts serious
doubt upon the validity of the natural area concept.").
207 Jefferson argued that suffrage is the true foundation of popular government.
See MATTHEWS, supra note 68, at 78.
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lective individualism we must answer the normative questions: "power
to whom?" and "power for what?
20 8
In the quest to define the political neighborhood, it is tempting to
rely on the inhabitants for the definition. After all, it is the inhabitants
who make up the collective individual which is the neighborhood.
While self-definition can be notoriously unreliable,0a it is not totally
without merit.
This concept is neither as arbitrary nor as circular as it may initially
appear. After all, we each define our respective space every day by what
we are and, sometimes more importantly, by what we are not.2'0 The
insistence on preserving present local boundary lines to define local
government is, in fact, more arbitrary and circular than reliance on self-
definition. Most people disregard these boundaries countless times
each day, while forming their own idea of region, which they organize
according to their personal concept of neighborhood. Instead of im-
posing objective definitions from the outside, we should strive toward a
subjective definition of neighborhood created by those seeking to be
defined. This subjective definition must be coupled with a realistic ac-
knowledgment of the need for some efficiently determined population
goals, while keeping in mind that our aim is the expression of individu-
alism.
21'
This process will inevitably generate dissent because there is no
212democratic way of deciding who gets to draw the boundaries. Thedissent can be incorporated into the process of neighborhood defini-
208Wood, supra note 8, at 54 ("Answers to the normative questions of 'power to
whom?' and 'power for what?' are to be modified continually in the light of contem-
pora0, values .... ").
- For example, people in one Chicago study defined the boundaries of their
neighborhood quite inconsistently. See WEIHER, supra note 47, at 26 (discussing a 1972
study of the South Shore community in Chicago); see also Ernesto G. Arias, Bottom-up
Neighbourhood Revitalisation: A Language Approach for Participatory Decision Support, 33
URB. STUDIES 1831, 1837 (1996) (describing various mechanisms, including computer
simulations, designed to assist neighborhoods in the task of self-definition).
According to Professor Frug, identity is not only made up of sameness, it is also
composed of and dependent upon differences. See Frug, supra note 3, at 259-60.
George Galster uses a similar tripartite economic model to define neighbor-
hood. He formulates algorithms to estimate congruence ("the degree to which an in-
dividual's externality space corresponds to predefined geographic boundaries"), gen-
erality ("the degree to which an individual's externality spaces for different types of
externalities correspond") and accordance ("the degree to which externality spaces
for different individuals in the same area correspond"). Galster, supra note 203, at
246-54.
212 See Voting Rights, supra note 3, at 802 ("[T]here is no uncontestably 'democratic'
way of deciding who [draws boundaries].").
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tion if the creation of the neighborhood is premised upon voluntary as-
sociation. The Lockean requirement of voluntary association for a le-
gitimate government, when used as a premise for such neighborhoods,
will insure that whatever the definition, the political neighborhood will
be treated as a body politic because all parties have consented by join-
ing the final product. 3 Even if people initially differ on their defini-
tion of the boundaries of the neighborhood ' 4 it is this final consensus
that will define the neighborhood.
B. Allowing Formation of the Political Neighborhood
Creation of the political neighborhood requires an analysis of the
fundamental political philosophy underlying secession. 5 While some
scholars maintain that secession be predicated upon "fault,21 I propose
that "no-fault," nonconsensual secessions be granted. To be sure, a
resident is always free to leave a jurisdiction. Secession, though, in-
volves more than a group of dissatisfied residents moving out of the ju-
risdiction. By seceding, the group wants to leave the jurisdiction and
213 SeeJohn Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Origina4 Extent and End of Civil Gov-
ernment §§ 95-96, in SOCIAL CONTRACT: ESSAYS BY LOCKE, HUME, AND ROUSSEAU, supra
note 1, at 56-57 (arguing that the consent of the individuals governed is a prerequisite
for a legitimate government that may act by will of the majority). But the presence of
involuntary members is necessary for a 'public' organization. See Robert C. Ellickson,
Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519, 1523 (1982) ("[T]he pres-
ence of involuntary members is... a necessary condition for the use of the adjective
'public' in ordinary language. ").
214 For example, people who lived in the same Chicago suburbs defined the
boundaries of the community differently. See WEIHER, supra note 47, at 26; see also
Grigsby et al., supra note 198, at 23 (cautioning that while subdivision of communities
into neighborhoods for planning purposes is commendable, "such an exercise may
easily lead to erroneous inferences about what these geographic units really mean in
the lives of the residents").
215 For a discussion of the Staten Island case, see Voting Rights, supra note 3
(advocating that Staten Island meet a tough standard before it be allowed to secede);
Florence L. Cavanna, Note, Home Rule and the Secession of Staten Island: City of New
York v. State of New York, 8 TOURO L. REv. 795 (1992) (discussing New York's home
rule);Jeffrey Underweiser, Note, The Legality of Staten Island's Attempt to Secede from New
York City, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 147 (1991) (arguing that New York's Home Rule Doc-
trine should be invoked to stop Staten Island's secession). Some state courts have ad-
vocated a liberal construction of secession laws, which allows more flexibility for seces-
sion. See, e.g., Harris Trust & Say. Bank v. Village of Barrington Hills, 549 N.E.2d 578,
581-82 (Il1. 1989) (recounting the court's long history of interpreting disconnection
statutes liberally).
2 6 Briffault contends that "[slecession should be predicated on a showing that the
municipal majority is systematically exploiting the minority, or at the very least that the
majority is advancing only its own values and consistently ignoring the minority's
needs and interests." Voting Rights, supra note 3, at 847.
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wants to take its property along.17
Opposition to secession can rest on democratic ideals or upon eco-
218nomic arguments of equity and externalities. I will discuss these ar-
guments in turn as they apply to the formation of the political neigh-
borhood. Abraham Lincoln argued that secession is fundamentally at
odds with democratic self-government based on majority rule. Lincoln
stated: "[T] he central idea of secession, is the essence of anarchy." '9 It
is difficult to demand on democratic principles that a mistreated
and/or ignored minority has the duty to stay and accept the majority's
rule. Some argue that a minority that has suffered no harm, however,
should not be allowed to secede because secession is not the demo-
220cratic manner of expressing dissatisfaction.
In other words, should secession be permitted even when there has
been no showing that the existing municipality has harmed the seces-
sionists in some way? This argument misses the point because secession
in the present context should not be dependent on the existing mu-
nicipality's failure to perform its duties.22' Instances will arise where the
existing municipality has fulfilled every duty to a group that neverthe-
less wants to secede, analogous to a no-fault divorce. This secession
should be granted because secession is based, not upon a failure of the
majority, but upon a community's desire to express an individuality that
it cannot express while remaining in the existing municipality.222 The
217 See Voting Rights, supra note 3, at 788 ("In a secession, people are determined to
leave the jurisdiction and to take their territory with them."); see also Allen Buchanan, To-
ward a Theory of Secession, 101 ETHICS 322, 326 (1991) ("The secessionist does not deny
the state's authority as such, but only its authority over her and the other members of
her group and the territory they occupy." (emphasis added)).
See Voting Rights, supra note 3, at 833-48 (discussing the case against secession in
terms of democracy, equity, efficiency and externalities). But see Allen Buchanan, Self-
Determination and the Right to Secede, 45 J. INT'L. AFF. 347, 353-58 (1992) (discussing
various justifications for secession including rectificatory justice (reappropriation of
stolen property by the rightful owners) and discriminatory redistribution (unfair taxa-
tion)); Buchanan, supra note 217, at 327-32 (same).
219 VotingRights, supra note 3, at 845-46 (quoting Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural
Address, reprinted in ABRAHAM LINCOLN, SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, 1859-1865, at 220
(Library of America 1989)).
22o See Voting Rights, supra note 3, at 846-47.
221 In the international arena the question of justification of secession in the ab-
sence of state-perpetuated injustice is best exemplified by Quebec's recent attempt to
secede from Canada on the basis of cultural preservation. The difficulty with this
ground for secession is finding a clear definition of "culture." Allen Buchanan asserts
that cultural preservation provides an adequate justification for national secession un-
der stringent conditions. See Buchanan, supra note 217, at 357-58 (discussing secession
for cultural self-preservation).
21 For a different opinion, see VotingRights, supra note 3, at 818-19 (presenting the
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response to this democracy argument recalls the purpose behind the
political neighborhood's creation: to allow full and free expression of
individuality. Secession in this context is not at odds with democracy
because it does not reject majority rule. Rather it rejects the majority
itself.y
The creation, and especially the placement of externalities upon
those uniquely unable to bear the costs is the most powerful argument
against "no-fault" secession. As stated before, there will be persons who
have neither the social nor the economic wherewithal to form a new
224political neighborhood. By default these individuals will remain in
what was the old municipality.2 The externalities of secession are not
internalized and will be borne by those outside the new political neigh-
borhood. To overcome this problem we must require that those who
secede will contribute to the cost of services for those left behind.
Here, collective individualism collides with collective public interest.
Therefore, an intermediate, federative tier of government must be cre-
ated to effectuate region-wide wealth redistribution for social service
expenditures. To use Rousseau's terminology, the political neighbor-
hood is based on the will of all, the sum of the individual wills (omnes ut
singuh), and the intermediate tier is based on the will of general inten-
tion "directed to the attainment of the general good" (omnes ut uni-
versi). 226
The precise mechanics of the intermediate tier's revenue-raising
(whether through a sales tax, an income tax or a property tax) are not
as important as the creation of a regional wealth redistribution mecha-
idea that secession laws should be like annexation laws, that is, requiring first, a refer-
endum in the area looking to secede, second, consent of the municipality left behind,
and third, state-level review that could overturn a denial of consent on the basis of the
"overall public interest" of the region).
22 See Voting Rights, supra note 3, at 836-42 (noting that secession raises equity con-
cerns regarding the "redistribution of municipal wealth").
224 Some urban researchers have found relatively lower mobility among lower-
income households. See Charles F. Adams et al., Flight from Blight and Metropolitan Sub-
urbanization Revisited, 31 URB. AFF. REv. 529, 535-36 (1996) (discussing study results
and noting that "migrants [to the suburbs] tend to be from the middle- and upper-
income levels").
An argument put forth for opposing secession is that secession may be resisted
if it would be fatal to the larger political unit. Superficially, this line of logic begs the
question. Furthermore, deeper analysis reveals that the ability to enter into interlocal
agreements for police, fire, water, etc., would save municipalities from doom. For a
discussion of this "self-defense" argument on the international level, see Buchanan,
supra note 217, at 332-50.
2 Sir Ernest Baker, Introduction to SOCIAL CONTRACT: ESSAYS BY LOCKE, HUME,
AND ROUSSEAU, supra note 1, at xxxiii (discussing Rousseau's concept of the will upon
which a state is based).
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nism.2 2 7 For while the secession of political neighborhoods may permit
the expression of full individualism, it can create glaring negative ex-
ternalities. Without the intermediate tier it is impossible to internalize
these externalities. This tier, though, would have a very limited func-
tion, primarily serving as a conduit for regional wealth redistribution.
To place any more power in the intermediate tier is to approach re-
gional government.2 8 Regional government is the antithesis of em-
powering the collective individual.
The creation of this regional federation is not purely an altruistic
endeavor on the part of the new political neighborhood. ' Our previ-
ous definition of self included not only what we are, but also what we
are not. In defining ourselves, it is useful to compare ourselves to what
we are not.23  Therefore, recognition of other individuals, other mu-
nicipalities, creates an interdependence that is necessary for the recog-
nition of self. The federative tier permits full expression of individual-
ity while capturing the externalities created by such personal choice.
V. POLITICAL REALITYAND SOCIALJUSTICE
"[T]he problem, therefore, of the present is to lead our law to hold a
227 In this respect, I suspect Ijoin whatJoan Williams calls the "third generation of
twentieth century reformers who have sought to reformulate city status as a first step in
redefining the body politic in order to solve pressing social problems." Williams, supra
note 3, at 150 (discussing Frug's reform ideas).
28 In this respect I disagree with Professor Briffault. Although he also envisions a
two-tier local government, he is willing to shift certain governmental functions to the
regional level while reserving others to pre-existing local governments. See Who Rules
at Home?, supra note 3 at 411-19 (discussing regional governments). I question how he
can take power away from local governments while "assuring them continuing auton-
omy over a range of other functions." Id. at 413. Likewise, I disagree with the structure
of Professor Frug's regional legislature. See Frug, supra note 3, at 294-300. I fear that
by empowering the intermediate tier with discretionary functions (not merely admin-
istrative duties), we move away from decentralization and toward regional govern-
ment.
=9To avoid pure altruism the framework must be constructed to withstand any
distributive (as opposed to redistributive) pressures that may develop over time. A dis-
tributive policy identifies "the class of potential recipients [as] virtually unlimited, so
that there is no clearly definable group that comprehends themselves as taxed to sup-
port others without themselves benefiting." DouGLAsJ. WATSON ET AL., THE POLITICS
OF REDISTRIBUTING URBAN AID 123-27 (1994) (discussing distributive versus redistribu-
five policies). I advocate a redistributive policy where the taxed do not benefit directly
from the revenue raised by the tax.
230 For a fascinating discussion of this topic, see Frug, supra note 3, at 258-63
(describing the complexities inherent in defining identity).
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more even balance between individualism and collectivism."
-Roscoe Pound
23 '
Now comes time for a pragmatic application of legal and social
theory.23 2 I say "pragmatic," and not "practical," because "practical" car-
ries the baggage of an economic efficiency analysis. The goal here is
not to promote efficiency above all else. Rather, the goals should be
the legal recognition of an individual's social and economic desires and
the implementation of legal vehicles to further that recognition.2
There are two questions on the table: is a government structure prem-
ised upon individual cum collective choice possible? And even if it is,
why would anyone opt for this form of government?
A. The Paradox of a Collective Choice Democracy
Democratic government is premised upon legislative enactment of
collective will as determined by majority voting. Because codification of
collective will is binding on dissenters it is distinct from a series of indi-
vidual choices2 4 Therefore, although individualism forms the basis of
our newly empowered neighborhood, combining individual prefer-
ences into a democratic society may have paradoxical results if we try to
find the will of the majority.23 The tension between individual choice
231 RONALD CHESTER, INHERITANCE, WEALTH, AND SOCIETY 97 (1982) (quoting
Roscoe Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law, 18 THE GREEN BAG 17, 24 (1906)).
232 By using the term "pragmatic," I do not mean to invoke the philosophical defi-
nition of pragmatism in its strictest sense. Rather, I am employing the term in a more
colloquial sense. As Richard Warner points out: "Sometimes the label connotes little
more than taking a serious interest in practical politics and the realities of human well-
being and suffering...." Richard Warner, Why Pragmatism? The Puzzling Place of Prag-
matism in Critical Theory, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 535, 539. However, even the more philo-
sophical definition of pragmatism may be applicable insofar as pragmatism recognizes
that law is "'contingent notjust upon the acts of legislatures or other authoritative en-
tities, but also upon the surrounding social context, the content of an entire form of
life.'" Stephen J. Schnably, Property and Pragmatism: A Critique of Radin's Theory of Prop-
erty and Personhood, 45 STAN. L. REV. 347, 348 (1993) (quoting Margaret Jane Radin,
Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 808 (1989)).
233 If the last statement sounds sanctimonious, please forgive me. I am taking to
heart what Steven Smith found to be the function of legal pragmatism: "not to say
things that lawyers andjudges do not know, but rather to remind lawyers andjudges of
what they already believe but often fail to practice. The pragmatist is a kind of
preacher." Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 409, 411 (1990).
234 See SHAUN HARGREAVES HEAP ET AL, THE THEORY OF CHOICE: A CRITICAL
GUIDE 199 (1992) ("A collective choice, as distinct from ... a series of individual
choices . .. has the characteristic that it holds for all members of a given group.").
23 See Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1520
(1990) (noting that because there is no fair way to combine individual preferences, "it
may be impossible to reflect accurately such a thing as the will of the majority"); Rich-
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and collective will exists on two levels in the proposed structure of local
government. First, regardless of how homogeneous the political
neighborhood might be, there will inevitably be dissension between the
community and the individual. Second, the federative tier's redistribu-
tive function counteracts individual choice because participation is
mandatory regardless of residential location within the region. Hence,
the willingness of an individual to allow herself to be bound by the will
of the community (whether the neighborhood or the region) must be
grounded in more than individual choice. I will address each source of
tension in turn.
1. The Individual Within the Political Neighborhood
Rational, individual choice must at some point give way to collective
choice and social justice. By acceding to the necessity of collective
choice over individual choice, I do not give collective will lexicographic
priority over individuality. "  I am simply acknowledging the connec-
tions between rational choice and theories of social justice.27 Just as a
purely individualistic theory 2" of society is ultimately unworkable in
239modern living, a purely utilitarian collective theory does not give in-
dividual choice its proper respect. To find a theory of social justice we
should go back to the Social Contract of Rousseau:
Some form of association must be found as a result of which the whole
strength of the community will be enlisted for the protection of the per-
son and property of each constituent member, in such a way that each,
when united to his fellows, renders obedience to his own will, and re-
mains as free as he was before.
2 40
ard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory,
Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2121, 2124 (1990) ("[S]ocial
choice theorists claim democracy cannot avoid being defective . . . ."); see also Arrow's
"Impossibility Theorem," supra note 28 and accompanying text.
For Rawls, liberty always has lexical order and can only be restricted for the sake
of liberty. SeeJOHN RAWLS, A THEORYOFJUSTICE 250 (1971) (listing only two cases in
which liberty can be restricted: when "(a) a less extensive liberty must strengthen the
total system of liberty shared by all, and [when] (b) a less than equal liberty must be
acceptable to those citizens with the lesser liberty").
" See HEAP ET AL., supra note 234, at 260 (postulating that there are links between
theories of social justice and rational choice, with some links being stronger than oth-
ers).
238 That is, society is a collection of individuals; society itself has no purpose.
239 That is, society is simply an aggregate of the welfare of individuals without dis-
tinguishing amongst those constituents.
0 SOcIAL CONTRACr: ESSAYS BY LOCKE, HUME, AND ROUSSEAU, supra note 1, at
180.
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The political neighborhood would be a voluntary scheme with
autonomous members and self-imposed obligations that premise social
cooperation upon mutual advantage."'
Grounding our new framework of local government on such con-
tractarianism allows us to express two fundamental ideals. First, the
value of liberty is maintained as it is will, not force, that underlies the
government. Second, the collective value ofjustice is preserved as the
base of our society is right, not might.212 The social contract that binds
the community assures that while a member may sacifice a portion of
his or her individuality for the good of the community, society will only
243demand so much as is necessary to achieve social justice.
As Rawls stated, however,
[W]e are not to think of the original contract as one to enter a particu-
lar society or to set up a particular form of government. Rather, the
guiding idea is that the principles ofjustice for the basic structure of so-
ciety are the object of the original agreement. They are the principles
that free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests
would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamen-
tal terms of their association. These principles are to regulate all further
agreements; they specify the kinds of social cooperation that can be en-
tered into and the forms of government that can be established. This
way of regarding the principles ofjustice I shall call justice as fairness.
244
A recent contribution to the contractarian literature is David
Gauthier's Morals By Agremnent.24s Although not without critics,24r Gauth-
241 As Rawls has stated:
[A] society satisfying the principles of justice as fairness comes as close as a
society can to being a voluntary scheme, for it meets the principles which free
and equal persons would assent to under circumstances that are fair. In this
sense its members are autonomous and the obligations they recognize self-
imposed.
RAX.LS, supra note 236, at 13-14.
242 See id. at 5 ("[Societies] understand the need for, and... affirm, a characteristic
set of principles for assigning basic rights and duties and for determining.., the
proper distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation.").
This argument is along the lines of the Hobbesian necessity of a social contract
to induce social cooperation. In that model, the "role of sovereign power is... to
supply some assurance to each individual that others will keep ... the bargain." See
HEAP ET AL., supra note 234, at 202-03.
244 RAWLS, supra note 237, at 11.
243 DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BYAGREEMENT 9 (1986) (presenting a contractarian
rationale for morality where "[morality] emerges ... from the application of the
maximizing conception of rationality to certain structures of interaction [and where
the a]greed mutual constraint is the rational response to these structures").
246 g
SeeAllen Buchanan, Justice as Reciprocity Versus Subject-Centered Justice, 19 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 227-28 (1990) (referring to Gauthier as a proponent of the idea ofjustice as
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ier contends that justice is the outcome of a rational bargain among
247
voluntary contributors. In our voluntary political neighborhood, in-
dividuals should be willing to sacrifice their goal of maximizing indi-
vidual utility based not upon benevolence, but rather upon realization
of a mutual advantage. The bargain model acknowledges self-interest,
but fits it into the framework of the necessity for social living.
2. The Individual Within the Region
Although a contractarian notion of community cooperation may
easily apply within the political neighborhood, the concept of mutual
advantage requires further refinement to fit around the redistributive
goals of the federative tier. The Rawlsian, contractarian, notion ofjus-
tice is that cooperation is founded on a voluntary system of fairness.248
Fairness, though, is a subjective term. 249 To those on the receiving end
of intraregional wealth redistribution, the system may certainly appear
fair. However, to those on the paying end, the fairness may be harder
to prove. What is the basis for asserting that those who are better off
have the duty to help those who are less fortunate? What is the mutual
advantage?
25 °
reciprocity-"a strain of thought.., that threatens to shatter the basic conceptual
framework within which our legal system and commonsense morality formulate the
problems of justice"); see also BRIAN BARRY, JUSTICE AS IMPARTIALITY 42-45 (1995)
(arguing that there are serious flaws in Gauthier's theory ofjustice as mutual advan-
tage).
247 He explains:
The just person is fit for society because he has internalized the idea of mu-
tual benefit, so that in choosing his course of action he gives primary consid-
eration to the prospect of realizing the co-operative outcome. If he is able to
bring about.., an outcome that is both (nearly) fair and (nearly) optimal,
then he chooses to do so; only if he may not reasonably expect this does he
choose to maximize his own utility.
GAUTHIER, supra note 245, at 157.
248 See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
249 One definition of fairness that can be applied is a distribution of goods that is
both envy-free (no one prefers another's bundle to their own) and Pareto-optimal
(when one person's welfare increases, no one's decreases, and social welfare in-
creases). See HEAP ET AL., supra note 234, at 319-22 (describing the overlap between
justice and fairness).
250 'One essential feature of a mutual-advantage theory is that there is no place for
purely redistributive transfers of income-for transfers which impose a cost on some
people so as to benefit others." HEAP, supra note 234, at 278. Critics of Gauthier point
to the unjust outcome when basing justice on mutual advantage. See supra notes 241
and 246 and accompanying text. If a severely handicapped person cannot contribute
to the cooperative effort, does this mean she may justly be excluded from the fruits of
that effort? Fortunately, I do not believe we have to reach this perplexing 'question.
As discussed infra, the contribution of the poor is in acquiescing to the political and
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We can approach the answer from two directions. The first would
be to determine whether those receiving wealth redistribution contrib-
uted to the cooperative effort to establish the mutual advantage. The
answer is yes. The cooperative contribution of the region's poor is the
sanction by the poor of an insular political neighborhood. The contri-
bution of the poor is their consent to economic exclusion.2 1' In ex-
change for this exclusion, the region's well-off must contribute to the
economic externalities caused by the exclusion.
Alternatively, there is a second theoretical rationale for the imposi-
tion of the redistributive tier. This theory is Rawls's refinement of the
idea ofjustice as mutual advantage, and it is expressed in his difference
principle. 2 The difference principle allows more productive people to
earn more than less productive people only if the poorest people in so-
ciety are thereby made less poor. "[N]o amount of gain to the better-
off can be justified if it is achieved at any cost to the poor."5 The dif-
ference principle expresses the concept of social reciprocity in eco-
nomic gain.2"
With the addition of the concept of reciprocity, as expressed by the
difference principle, the wealthier residents cannot gain without also
giving a benefit to the poorer residents. The creation of the political
neighborhood benefits those within the neighborhood by allowing
greater expression of individual choice. In accordance with the differ-
ence principle this gain cannot be at the expense of the poor. The
reciprocity is the federative redistribution tier.
The difference principle is grounded on its requirement that a co-
operative society benefits all of its members. "Thus the more advan-
taged.., man cannot say that he deserves and therefore has a right to a
scheme of cooperation in which he is permitted to acquire benefits in
ways that do not contribute to the welfare of others."2 5
economic insularity (notwithstanding the federative tier) of the political neighbor-
hood.
In effect this is the end of inclusionary zoning requirements such as those in
Mount LaureL
2" RAWLS, supra note 236, at 83 ("Social and economic inequalities are to be ar-
ranged so that they are.., to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged .... ").
HEAP ET AL., supra note 234, at 272 (contrasting Rawls's theory with utilitarian-
ism).
054 See RAWNLS supra note 236, at 102 ("Thus we are led to the difference principle if
we wish to set up the social system so that no one gains or loses from his arbitrary place
in the distribution of natural assets of his initial position in society without giving or
receiving compensating advantages in return.").
25 Id. at 104.
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B. Dissatisfaction with the Status Quo
If mutual advantage and reciprocity in society convince the well-off
to participate in a regional wealth redistribution scheme (or at leastjus-
tify such participation), why not merely impose this requirement within
the present state of local government? Why should we tear down the
present state and rebuild along the parameters of a political neighbor-
hood? Or, alternatively, if there is such a societal cooperative require-
ment, why not erase all local boundaries and meld into one big re-
gional government?
The present state of local government represents the worst of both
worlds. On the one hand, residents, many of whom have sought secu-
rity in the suburbs, see frontal attacks on their individual will by city
politicians. 56 On the other hand, the poor in the city suffer because
the tax base necessary to support adequate social services has fled to the
suburbs. The political neighborhood would answer both of these con-
cerns by guaranteeing expression of individual will while requiring par-
ticipation in regional wealth redistribution.
Regional government also fails to overcome regional economic and
legal problems. Some may point to the interjurisdictional tax-sharing
cooperation effort of the Minneapolis-St. Paul region as an example of
workable, and working, regional government. Its success, however, has
yet to be duplicated on a large scale in other regions. As with any
wealth redistribution system, these types of efforts will survive only as
long as substantial numbers of nonbeneficiaries remain motivated and
willing to pay.2s These "nonbeneficiaries," placed within the new po-
litical neighborhood, on the other hand, will be motivated to continue
such participation due to the benefit of political and economic insular-
ity.
The answer comes back to what is the foundation of local govern-
ment: the individual. Proving mutual benefit, which is the predicate to
SrI See Rich Henson, Suburbs and City Join for a Chat at the Convention Center, PHILA.
INQUIRER, May 26, 1995, at B4 (indicating that Philadelphia Mayor Ed Rendell would
like the city to "get a slice of suburban tax revenues").
"57 The Minnesota Fiscal Disparities program, begun in 1975, is a tax-sharing pol-
icy that regionalizes a portion of the commercial-industrial tax base in the Minneapo-
lis-St. Paul metropolitan area. Each year 40% of new commercial-industrial tax base is
apportioned to the regional fiscal disparities pool. Tax revenues from the pool gener-
ated by a single regional tax rate are then distributed to municipalities based on local
tax capacities. See ROBERT INMAN ET AL., FISCAL FUTURE FOR AMERICAN CITIES:
LESSONS FROM THREE CITIES 19 (Wharton Real Estate Center Working Paper No. 189,
1994) (describing the Minneapolis project).
Z8 See WATSON ETAL., supra note 229, at 124-26.
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wealth redistribution, is problematic in regional government. In the
absence of allowing the individual free expression in the choice of local
government, the benefit to these "nonbeneficiaries" all but vanishes.
Instead of attempting to prove the positive externalities of the central
city to prod interlocal revenue sharing,29 we should allow local munici-
palities to fully realize their individuality and point to that as the benefit
to obligate regional wealth redistribution.
As a response to those who argue that restructuring local govern-
ment around the collective individual is politically unrealistic, I suggest
we explore the alternatives. We cannot continue under the present sys-
tem without regressing to economic apartheid: the haves in the sub-
urbs, the have-nots in the city. The disparity between the income levels
of suburban and city residents increases each year.' 6  On the other
hand, broad-based regional government has found little acceptance
outside of the Academy.' This resistance to regional government
comes from city dwellers and suburbanites alike.2r 2 Local government
as the collective individual is more politically attainable than regional
government and promises social justice lacking in the status quo.
CONCLUSION
In our attempt to "save" the city we have lost sight of the elements
that constitute the city. Why should we direct our scholarly energy, pol-
icy directives, or economic power toward revitalizing an anachronistic,
dying species of legal definition? The city that some are trying desper-
ately to save is not the classical city that was defined by its sphere of in-
fluence. It is the city of political boundary-making that is inapposite to
20 See Theodore Hershberg, Regional Cooperation: Stategies and Incentives for Global
Competitiveness and Urban Reform, 85 NAT'L CIVC REv. 25, 29 (1996) ("It is time for sub-
urban Republicans to sit down with urban Democrats. Both sides would come to the
table aware of shared interests.").
In 1960 the per capita income of city residents was 105% of that of suburban-
ites. By 1980 it dropped to 90%. In 1987 it fell again to 59%. In some cities the con-
trast is even more stark. For instance, in 1990 the per capita income of Philadelphia
city residents was 48% of their suburban neighbors. See Poindexter, supra note 5, at 10
(comparing the relative income levels of suburban and city dwellers over the past
three decades).
261 For a general discussion of voter resistance to regional government, see Kin-
caid, supra note 60.
262 See Peter Dreier, America's Urban Crisis: Symptoms, Causes, Solutions, 71 N.C. L.
REV. 1351, 1360 (1993) (noting resistance of suburban residents to the creation of
broad-based regional government); Ronald Smothers, City Seeks to Grow by Disappearing;
N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 18, 1993, at A10 (stating that resistance will come from "urban blacks
benefiting from a rising tide of political power").
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modem social and economic development.
Instead we must tear down the walls created by happenstance and
long-forgotten political will, and establish community as those within
the community would define it. Such redefinition would clearly benefit
those within the newly created communities, but the impact of the re-
definition would be much broader. We could begin to solve the eco-
nomic mismatch between the city and the suburbs-the city's dispro-
portionate burden of regional poverty versus the suburbs' advantage of
disproportionate regional wealth. Rather than viewing these difficulties
as "city" problems, we redefine them as "regional" problems and solve
them without regard to legally and politically created boundaries. But
as long as the legal structure maintains the long recognized bright-line
boundaries of the traditional city, any attempt at a regional solution will
fail. City will stand as a proxy for the existence of the problems of pov-
erty, crime and social dysfunction. Those who choose not to live in the
traditional city boundaries will resist a recasting of social problems as an
attempt to force a political, social and economic allegiance to an entity
they have fled.
By legally empowering the collective individual, as expressed in
choice of local government, we validate individual choice, ground local
government law in determinative legal doctrine, and begin to balance
regional economic inequalities.
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